鄂蘭 (Arendt) 論難民
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此文寫於2021年8月，時值塔利班重奪阿富汗。但難民處境一直存在，加上烏俄戰爭，也許應該重新思考這問題。另一方面，下文只是簡短介紹下鄂蘭 (Hannah Arendt) 書中一些片段，當成讀書筆記來看也可。
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關於難民，鄂蘭在《極權主義的起源》(The Origins of Totalitarianism) 第九章第二節 “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” 有很精彩的哲學反思。她寫的原是二戰後歐洲的處境，但相信適用於任何「無國籍者」(stateless person)。依歐洲17世紀以降的社會契約論傳統 (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau…)，人先有「天賦人權」，「政府」的合法性僅在它能保障這些權利。而當政權無法做到這點，人民就有理由反抗甚至推翻政府。「天賦人權說」把「人」想成一個抽空所有歷史語境的「普世的人」，因而有時被批評只是浪漫化的構想；但在釐清政權之合法性與人民反抗的根據而言，仍然有其現實意義。只不過，對難民而言，此皆空言：
The full implication of this identification of the rights of man with the rights of peoples in the European nation-state system came to light only when a growing number of people and peoples suddenly appeared whose elementary rights were as little safeguarded by the ordinary functioning of nation-states in the middle of Europe as they would have been in the heart of Africa. The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them… (p.291–2)
正因失去「能保護他們的政府」，難民的「人權」即使理論上同樣「不可侵犯」(inalienable)、在現實卻是「無處實施」(unenforceable)：
The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable - even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state. (p.293)
於是鄂蘭說，比言論/人身自由等更根本的，是 公民權 (rights of citizens)，或「擁有家園的權利」 (right to a home)。以下這段文字，出自鄂蘭之手，想到她曾作為猶太裔學者逃離納粹德國，更是心有戚戚焉：
The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice,…This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion. (p.296)
依此說，無國籍者不只失去了「自由」和「公義」。對無國籍者而言，「隸屬於某個群體」不再是理所當然 (a matter of course) ，而「離開」也不再是個人選擇 (a matter of choice) 。於是，他們失去的，不是「自由的權利」，而是「行動的權利」；不是「隨心所欲地思考的權利」，而是「發表意見的權利」(right to opinion) ——因若無國籍，根本無所謂能發表意見的空間。
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反思起來，大概可以分開兩個問題：
一、是關於「人權」和「政府」（政治主權）何者更根本的問題；
二、即使人權更根本，還有「究竟人權是否能獨立於政府而存在」的問題。
即使我們依契約論傳統堅持「人權」更根本，也並未回應第二個問題。這大概是鄂蘭的洞見。
19/8/21；13/5/22
所引書：Arendt, H., (1976). The Origins of Totalitarianism (New Edition with Added Prefaces). Harcourt Brace & Company.
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