'AirSea Battle' and its implications for Australia by BenjaminSchreer / ASPI

Planning the unthinkable war: 'AirSea Battle' and its implications for Australia by Benjamin Schreer / ASPI

http://www.aspi.org.au/htmlver/ASPI_planning_the_unthinkable_war/index.html

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of America's 'rebalance' towards the Asia–Pacific region, Australia's most important ally is reconsidering its military posture to deal with China's growing 'anti-access/area-denial' (A2/AD) capability, which is gradually eroding America's maritime dominance in the Western Pacific.  China's missiles can now reach large parts of the region.  In response, the Pentagon is working on an 'AirSea Battle' operational concept that aims to deter and, if necessary, to defeat the Chinese military.  While officially the concept isn't targeted against any specific country and is applicable elsewhere (for example, in the Strait of Hormuz), the US military's increased focus on China has given the concept much prominence in the strategic community.

The potential implications of AirSea Battle for Australia are far from trivial.  US policymakers consider Australia a key ally in the concept, not least because of our reliability to contribute forces to coalition operations.  We have a major interest in supporting America's rebalancing towards the Asia–Pacific region and a credible US war-fighting strategy as a deterrent against a China that's increasingly flexing its military muscles.  However, we also need to think through the potential implications of AirSea Battle. After all, this is about a potential military escalation with a major nuclear power.

The Australian strategic debate about AirSea Battle, to the degree that there's been one, has largely centred around two opposing camps: those who see it as a dangerous instrument to 'contain' China and potentially drag Australia into a nuclear escalation between the two great powers, and those who embrace the concept's logic and even argue that Australia should develop long-range strike capabilities to contribute to potential offensive operations against China.  However, it's possible to come to a more nuanced position—one that recognises the potential benefits of AirSea Battle while also identifying its shortcomings and the prospects and limitations of Australia's contribution.

The study addresses some key questions related to AirSea Battle: Is it feasible?  Does it make strategic sense?  How do key allies and partners in Northeast and Southeast Asia view the concept, and what role could they play? What could and should be Australia's specific contributions to AirSea Battle?

Chapter 1 describes China's growing military capacity to pose an increasingly sophisticated A2/AD challenge for US forward-deployed forces.  While it's important not to overstate the current power projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China has already changed the military balance in its 'near seas', particularly in the Taiwan Strait.  The PLA doesn't need to reach strategic parity with US forces.  Instead, its asymmetric strategy aims to prevent or complicate US interventions in territorial disputes by making the potential costs for American forces prohibitively high.  AirSea Battle aims at defeating such A2/AD strategies by withstanding an initial Chinese attack, followed by a 'blinding campaign' against PLA command and control networks, a 'missile suppression campaign' against China's land-based systems, and a 'distant blockade' against Chinese merchant ships in the Malacca Strait and elsewhere.  Importantly, it's based on the assumptions that the escalation can be kept below the nuclear threshold, and that Japan and Australia will be active allies throughout the campaign.  Far from being just a fancy of Pentagon planners, AirSea Battle has gained institutional momentum and first steps towards its implementation are being taken.

Chapter 2 analyses the feasibility and utility of AirSea Battle.  A common criticism is that the concept might be unaffordable, given severe cuts to the US defence budget.  Moreover, interservice rivalry might obstruct major shifts of resources.  However, despite inevitable budget cuts, the US military will most likely be able to spend well over US$450 billion (in today's dollars) annually between 2013 and 2021, so significant financial resources will be available for AirSea Battle.  The US has already begun shifting some of those resources away from the US Army and towards the Navy and Air Force.  Furthermore, interservice rivalries could be mitigated by incorporating the US Marines and the US Army in a broader strategy to counter A2/AD challenges.

The biggest questions about AirSea Battle are strategic.  In principle, the initiative should be welcomed as a way to strengthen America's conventional deterrence vis-a-vis China by developing a concept for operations in maritime zones contested by the PLA.  Deterrence is based on perceptions about intentions and capabilities.  Any Chinese leader would need to calculate the possibility of a US reaction in response to a major military action designed to change the status quo in the Western Pacific.  And, contrary to conventional wisdom, states go to war over 'reputational' interests.  AirSea Battle could thus make a contribution to regional stability by promoting deterrence in Sino-US strategic affairs.

That said, AirSea Battle is optimised for high-intensity conventional war between China and the US and its allies. It applies only in extreme cases, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, PLA missile attacks on Japan or US bases in the region, or the sinking of an American aircraft carrier.  However, Chinese coercive military actions in territorial disputes with its neighbours (short of high levels of escalation) are much more likely.  AirSea Battle is therefore not a 'catch all' solution to America's conventional deterrence dilemma in the Western Pacific.  Moreover, it isn't clear how AirSea Battle fits within a broader US grand strategic framework to deal with China's military rise.  As a result, the concept suffers from an image problem, as many observers equate it to US attempts to militarily 'contain' China and wonder about the relationship between operational and political objectives.  Analysts have therefore called for the development of a grand strategic framework to guide US Asia–Pacific defence strategy. Allies such as Australia should press for a declassified, allied version of AirSea Battle to have a better understanding about Pentagon thinking.

AirSea Battle also faces the challenge of a potential nuclear escalation.  A central element of the concept is the deep penetration of Chinese territory to destroy and disrupt PLA command and control nodes used for conventional operations.  But such a 'blinding campaign' could increase the risk of a disproportionate Chinese response, including nuclear escalation.  Beijing might well perceive such attacks as American attempts to disarm China's nuclear deterrent and could thus be tempted to nuclear pre-emption.  Thus it's important to also consider alternatives debated among US strategists, such as 'offshore control', which refrains from direct strikes against the Chinese mainland while still retaining the capability to deny China freedom of military action in its maritime approaches.

Chapter 3 discusses the potential role of key allies and partners in Northeast and Southeast Asia in AirSea Battle. Not surprisingly, the result is mixed.  In Northeast Asia, Japan and Taiwan are the most comfortable with the premises of the concept, given that they're 'frontline' states and deeply worried about China's rise and intentions.  Japan, in particular, is moving to acquire significant air and maritime capability to support its US ally in the event of war.  Despite the fact that South Korea has also become more concerned about China and has started to shift its defence planning more towards maritime power projection, it's much more ambivalent about the concept.  Its main objective remains to defend against North Korean aggression, and its political disputes with China are of much lesser intensity.

Southeast Asian allies and partners seem even more guarded, partly because it's unclear how AirSea Battle could apply to their maritime disputes with China.  The Philippines is politically the most supportive and could bring added value as a geostrategic location for US forces.  The most potent military power in the region is Singapore, where the US has now forward deployed littoral combat ships and could potentially use naval bases for submarines and repairs.  However, Singapore doesn't have maritime disputes with China and is ambivalent about how it would react in times of war.  Vietnam and Indonesia could also play important roles in the AirSea Battle concept.  However, both Hanoi and Jakarta are also reluctant to be seen to be close to Washington .  As a result, political support for involvement in AirSea Battle planning in Southeast Asia might be low despite regional countries looking to the US to support their hedging strategies against a more assertive China.

Chapter 4 analyses the potential implications of AirSea Battle for Australia.  Our political reliability as an ally, our geostrategic position between the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the high standard of the ADF make us a preferred US partner.  In the view of some proponents, Australia's maximum contribution could include:

• providing 'strategic depth' for the US ally (including by allowing the US access to Australian facilities), and conducting so-called 'supportive rearguard operations', by protecting forward-operating troops and allied bases in Northeast Asia, and even by developing a long-range strike capability to penetrate Chinese airspace
• conducting 'offensive amphibious strike' operations in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific archipelagos to attack Chinese facilities and troops operating in the area
• contributing to 'peripheral campaigns' (that is, participating in the maritime interdiction of Chinese merchant and energy vessels to threaten Beijing with a crippling 'distant blockade').

The Australian Government has an interest in making an active contribution to the US military 'rebalance'.  Providing the US with greater strategic depth is one means to do so.  While the rotational deployment of a US Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to Darwin so far has been largely symbolic and not directly tied to America's AirSea Battle planning, the MAGTF in combination with long-range American strike aircraft operating from our north could become an integral component of such an operational framework in a Southeast Asian context.  In the (however unlikely) event of a major war in Northeast Asia between the US and China, Australia would most likely allow its US ally to operate from Australian territory.  A major upgrade of HMAS Sterling to host US carrier strike groups or the use of Cocos Island airfields for US strike aircraft is also a future option should the strategic environment deteriorate significantly.  Finally, the ADF could provide niche capabilities (such as tanker aircraft, airborne early warning and control, and airborne electronic warfare assets) and 'backfill' for US assets involved in direct attacks.

That said, fully embracing the logic behind AirSea Battle or developing specific military capabilities to underpin the concept's implementation are so far not in Australia's interests.  Openly signing up for the concept would send a strong political message to China that the ADF is now actively planning and equipping for a potential war with the PLA.  There's no need to do so—the government's decision to invite the US Marines to Darwin has already displayed Australia's political commitment to the ANZUS alliance.  The development of long-range strike capabilities against China would also be an unnecessary provocation to Beijing, let alone a very costly one.  Likewise, a serious Australian amphibious strike capability is a rather unrealistic prospect.  Finally, a 'distant blockade' against China in Southeast Asian maritime chokepoints (the Malacca, Lombok and/or Sunda straits) is much easier proposed than done.  In any event, such actions would be considered by Beijing as an act of war. Still, Australia could play a role in such operations, given our proximity to maritime chokepoints and our maritime and air capabilities.

Australian governments will be able to make a noteworthy military contribution to a US AirSea Battle framework independently of any public commitment to a concept that's still in its early stages and seems designed for a strategic environment in Asia that's yet to materialise.