維基解密：美中關係展望-3（政治合作，2008.02.24）

維基解密：美中關係展望-3（政治合作，2008.02.24）

【Comment】中國只懂「卡」。卡得住中國，中國就會注重「輿論」。北京奧運、上海世博、廣州亞運的確有效，問題是現在是2010，三大戲碼都演完了，北京就兩手一攤：俺也沒輒～

Viewing cable 08BEIJING661, Prospects for U.S.-China Relations●WikiLeaks（2008.02.24）

POLITICAL COOPERATION

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共享美中和平、安全與繁榮的利益，同時存在摩擦。價值、政治制度、個別目標與方法的差異將會持續。

政治與安全摩擦之區域，非常多，包括中國的威權政治制度、中國支持難搞的政權、中國軍事現代化的突破、中國認定美國幫助台灣、西藏與新疆的分離主義、增長的國族主義，以及中美雙方在全球政治、經濟與軍事優勢上的競爭。面對這些差異，美中領導者需建立互信，並願意共同維繫廣泛的戰略利益。中國理解其在一穩定與非核的朝鮮半島的利益，且對於朝鮮領導層無能建立穩定支持其人民、讓人民逃難等，已經使中國緊密的在六方會談中和美國合作。

中國在達爾富立場上的演變，由北京奧運相關的國際北京叫唆的種族屠殺，顯示極端外交與公開施壓可某種程度的改變中國政策。中國在緬甸與伊朗的合作雖不情願也效果有限，但確實有效。我們能促使中國成長的相互依賴，以及其關心國際公眾形象，使其支持對美國有利的多邊行為。雲程譯，感謝feema大提供

其3. (C) Shared overall U.S.-China interests in peace, security and prosperity likewise are dogged by frictions.  Differences over values, political systems, specific goals and means will continue.

The list of areas of political and security friction is long and includes China's authoritarian political system, China's support for unsavory regimes, China's breakneck military modernization, China's paranoid fear that the United States secretly promotes regime change and "separatists" in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, growing nationalism and the sense in some quarters in both Washington and Beijing that the United States and China are commencing a long-term struggle for global political, economic and military supremacy.  Countering these differences is the buildup of mutual trust between the U.S. and Chinese leadership and the willingness to work together in an increasingly broad spectrum of common strategic interests.  China's realization of its own interest in a stable, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and frustration with an inept North Korean leadership seemingly incapable of creating an economy that can sustainably support its own people, leading to constant refugee outflows, has led to close cooperation with the United States in the Six-Party Talks.

The evolution in China's position on Darfur, driven by the Olympics-related international publicity concerning China's role in abetting genocide, shows that extreme diplomatic and public pressure can redirect Chinese policy to a degree.  China's cooperation on Burma and Iran has been grudging and limited, but real. We have been able to leverage China's growing interdependence and concern for its global public image into support for multilateral actions that further U.S. goals.