中國放棄「不首先使用」核武原則？◎BBC（2013.04.19）

【Comment】
Beijing’s omission that they will never use nuclear weapons first in her White Paper on National Defense released recently was on purpose. 
In fact, some two years ago Beijing declared that she will use nuclear weapons to fight back once her major cities or critical infrastructures were attacked.    revised on 2013/04/20

應該是「美媒」，BBC中文版標題搞錯了。
實際上，對「中國將率先使用核武」的憂慮，已經在兩年前北京宣稱「將以核武反擊對中國重要城市與基礎建設進行攻擊的國家」中提出了。因此，此次的省略才會被視為有意。

英媒：中國放棄「不首先使用」核武原則？◎BBC（2013.04.19）

http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/press_review/2013/04/130419_press_china_nuclear_first_use.shtml

《國際先驅論壇》報周五發表美國卡內基國際和平基金會高級研究員詹姆士·阿克頓（James Acton）評論文章稱，中國周二公布的國防白皮書沒有提及「不首先使用核武器」的這一原則，應當引起關注。

文章說，「不首先使用核武器」是半個多世紀來中國核政策的基石，最新發表的國防白皮書沒有提及這一點，會帶來不確定因素。

1964年，中國首次試驗核武器後承諾「在任何時候、任何情況下將不會首先使用核武器」，1998年的首份白皮書至2011年的歷次國防白皮書中也明確重申這一原則。

作者認為，新的白皮書沒有提及這一點並非由於疏忽，報告編纂者也不會這麼大意，這顯示中國核戰略的思維正發生改變。

習近平當選中共總書記後於去年12月對解放軍第二炮兵發表講話。據報，他表示核武器能給中國的大國地位提供戰略支持。在這次講話中，習近平也沒有提及「不首先使用核武」。

如果將習近平的講話和新的國防白皮書聯繫起來，這會令美國、尤其是盟國日本不安。中國的一些「鷹派」也會利用這一時機，推動軍方放棄「不首先使用」的承諾。

文章說，中國的白皮書也會給奧巴馬的核政策造成麻煩。奧巴馬有意宣佈美國的核武器只會用來發揮威懾作用。

北京核武政策的變化或許是對這一地區安全形勢變化的反應。美國在東北亞加強導彈防禦系統，雖然表示這針對的是朝鮮，但也會被認為是制衡中國日益增強的軍力。中國軍方擔心，美國的導彈防禦系統有朝一日會解除中國遠程核武的能力。

文章說，中國希望通過白皮書傳遞出一個新信息：如果未來出現危機、如果美國會在導彈防禦系統的支持下用常規武器襲擊中國核武，中國或許會首先使用核武器。

因此，中美雙方高層在這一問題上的坦誠對話變得至關重要，儘管核危機升級的可能性不大，但結果會是毀滅性的，所以，雙方需建立互信。

Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons? ◎James Acton（2013.04.19）

http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/18/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/g08k

Interpreting any country’s pronouncements about its nuclear weapons can be a study in fine distinctions, but occasionally a state says — or fails to say — something in a clear break from the past.  A Chinese white paper on defense, released on Tuesday, falls into this category and now demands our attention, because it omits a promise that China will never use nuclear weapons first.

That explicit pledge had been the cornerstone of Beijing’s stated nuclear policy for the last half-century.  The white paper, however, introduces ambiguity.  It endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses.

With North Korea making overt nuclear threats, the job of deciphering Beijing’s cryptic and mild-sounding statement may not seem a priority.  Indeed, it is because the likelihood of nuclear escalation with China is low that most defense experts are likely to focus instead on what the white paper has to say about China’s rapidly expanding conventional military capabilities.

But all of those developments may be closely connected.

In 1964, immediately after testing its first nuclear weapon, China promised to “never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.”  This “no-first-use pledge” was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers, from the first, in 1998, through the sixth and most recent, in 2011.  It was among the strongest assurances in the world of no-first-use, a stance that the United States has never taken.

The change this year is almost certainly not the result of bureaucratic error.  No-first-use has been such an intrinsic part of the Chinese nuclear liturgy that the authors of the white paper would have been extremely unlikely to have forgotten it. Besides, other evidence indicates that a broader rethinking of Chinese nuclear strategy may be under way.

Last December, shortly after being selected as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, who last month became China’s president, gave a speech to the Second Artillery Force, which is responsible for China’s land-based nuclear weapons.  In the past, borrowing Mao Zedong’s imagery for China’s adversaries, Chinese officials have generally played down the value of nuclear weapons, describing them as “paper tigers.”  But in a significant rhetorical shift, Mr. Xi is reported to have said that nuclear weapons create strategic support for the country’s status as a major power.  In the speech, Mr. Xi did not repeat China’s no-first-use promise.

Taken together, the speech and the white paper are likely to create concern in the United States and among its allies, particularly Japan.  Unquestionably, some of that concern will be stirred up by self-described “China hawks” who have been dismissing China’s no-first-use pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades.  Now, opportunistically, they may make a big issue of the apparent shift.

But theirs will not be the only voices expressing concern; indeed, even moderates are likely to agree.  Only last month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a report by a bipartisan group of American analysts that said China’s no-first-use pledge was “broadly stabilizing and should be sustained.”

The white paper may also make it more difficult politically for President Obama to carry out his ambitious nuclear agenda, which includes creating the conditions that would allow the United States to declare that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others.

The apparent shift in Beijing’s nuclear doctrine may well be a response to other security trends in the region.  Even before the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, issued his latest round of nuclear threats, the Pentagon announced plans to reinforce its missile defenses in northeast Asia.

The United States has said that those defenses are meant to defend against North Korea, but they also appear to be intended to counterbalance Beijing’s growing arsenal of regional conventional missiles.  Chinese defense planners worry that the United States may one day develop those defenses to the point at which they could neutralize China’s long-range nuclear forces as well, a fear exacerbated by American investments in conventional-strike capabilities.

So China may intend the new language in its white paper to send a signal: that in a future crisis, if it concluded that the United States was about to attack its nuclear arsenal with conventional weapons that were backed up by missile defenses, China might use its nuclear weapons first.  The United States should recognize this concern; it was called “use ’em or lose ’em” during the cold war.

A candid, high-level dialogue regarding nuclear deterrence has been needed for some time.  The new white paper and Mr. Xi’s speech have made the need urgent.

While the probability of nuclear escalation is low, the consequences would be catastrophic.  The risk of nuclear use is already unacceptably high and, for that reason alone, mutual confidence-building is necessary.  In addition, mutual suspicion in the nuclear domain spills over into the conventional domain, complicating efforts to reduce the chance of any kind of conflict.

Unfortunately, in spite of repeated invitations by the administrations of Presidents Obama and George W. Bush, China has not been willing to engage in a sustained conversation.  The presidency of Xi Jinping may, however, present an opportunity.  Given that Mr. Xi appears to have a personal interest in nuclear strategy, he may be willing to corral China’s military into engaging with the United States.  His representatives should explain why China’s nuclear doctrine and posture are evolving.  In the meantime, Beijing should avoid actually repudiating no-first-use to make it easier to reinstate the doctrine down the line.

For its part, Washington could make successful engagement more likely by offering to broaden such talks to include the full range of strategic military interactions between the two countries.  Because the conventional arms competition in the western Pacific may be heightening Chinese concerns about the survivability of its nuclear forces, such a dialogue might appear more attractive to China than one narrowly focused on nuclear weapons.

No one can predict whether Mr. Xi will accept a renewed offer to talk.  But it would be a win-win proposition.

This article was originally published in the New York Times.