2013美國國防部呈國會報告書：摘要、領土爭議、台海部分

2013美國國防部呈國會報告書：摘要、領土爭議、台海部分

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China◎DoD（2013.05）http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf?utm_content=buffera9f38&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Buffer

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict.  Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment.  However, as China’s interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations.  Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while others could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.

To support the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) expanding set of roles and missions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustained investment in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (what PLA strategists refer to as “counter-intervention operations”).  The PLA also continued to improve capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike; advanced fighter aircraft; limited regional power projection, with the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning; integrated air defenses; undersea warfare; improved command and control; and more sophisticated training and exercises across China’s air, naval, and land forces.

During their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and then-PRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.” Within that framework, the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to build a military-to-military relationship with China that is sustained and substantive, while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States, our allies and partners, and the greater international community in the delivery of public goods.  As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it also will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program.  In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.

Territorial Disputes.  Senior Chinese officials have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as a “core interest” and all officials repeatedly state China’s opposition to and willingness to respond to actions it perceives as challenging this core interest.  In 2012, this was demonstrated by Chinese actions at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

The Chinese government maintains that its maritime rights extend to virtually the entire South China Sea and often illustrates this claim using a “nine-dash line” that encompasses much of the South China Sea area.  At the same time, Beijing is ambiguous about the precise meaning of the nine-dash line; to date, China has not clarified the meaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis.  In April 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels and Philippine coast guard vessels engaged in a protracted standoff at Scarborough Reef, after the Philippine Navy attempted to conduct a fishing enforcement action against Chinese fishermen.

中國與台灣已經實施幾次聯合安全與警察任務，也於2012年8月舉行一次海上救援演習，雙方平等動員總共2架直升機、14艘艦艇以及300位人員。同樣在8月，中國與台灣警方逮捕30位人口偷渡與賣淫嫌犯，這是雙方第一次合作。

在2011年10月中，馬英九總統聲明可以在未來10年內與中國達成兩岸和平協議。但立即遭到大眾廣泛的反對。馬因此設下和平協議的前提條件。雖然偶而顯露不耐，中國仍尊重台灣目前的兩岸關係作法。2012年11月，中共新任總書記習近平送給馬總統（國民黨馬主席）一個訊息，其中強調必須持續促進兩岸和平進展。此種一上任就致送的訊息顯示習近平可能會遵循胡錦濤的在兩岸的多層次戰略，而不是已武力強迫統一。胡總統像在2012年11月對中共18大提出的報告使用了促進和平統一與呼籲雙方探討政治關係，與擬定合理的協議以建立軍事互信機制。（原文為：希望双方共同努力，探讨国家尚未统一特殊情况下的两岸政治关系，作出合情合理安排；商谈建立两岸军事安全互信机制，稳定台海局势；协商达成两岸和平协议，开创两岸关系和平发展新前景。）[1]

China and Taiwan have also undertaken some combined security and police operations, and held a combined maritime rescue exercise in August 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14 vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sides equally represented.  Also in August, Chinese and Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects in a human-trafficking and prostitution ring – a first collaborative effort to combat human trafficking.

During a mid-October 2011 speech, President Ma stated that a cross-Strait peace agreement with China might be attainable in 10 years, but backed down immediately in the face of widespread negative public reaction and Ma specified the conditions under which he would pursue such an agreement.  Despite occasional signs of impatience, China appears content to respect Taiwan’s current approach to cross-Strait relations.  In November 2012, Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected general secretary of the CCP Central Committee sent a message to President Ma (in the latter’s capacity as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang Party), emphasizing the need to continue promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.  This early message suggests that China under Xi Jinping may be willing to follow President Hu Jintao ’s multi-pronged strategy for developing cross-Strait relations rather than compelling unification through the use of force.   President Hu in his report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 used language that promoted peaceful reunification and called for both sides to explore political relations and make reasonable arrangements to discuss the creation of a military confidence-building mechanism.

[1]  http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665_11.htm    accessed on 2013/05/08