美國會介入保衛台灣嗎？要問日本。Jen Kirby@VOX / Taimocracy翻譯 20240130
美國會介入保衛台灣嗎？要問日本。Would the US intervene to defend Taiwan? Ask Japan. Jen Kirby@VOX 20240130
If China were to invade Taiwan, the American response could depend on its key ally. 假使中國入侵台灣，美國將端賴其關鍵盟邦才能夠回應。
TOKYO, Japan — If we’ve got to pick a year, it’s 2027. Imagine China is harassing Taiwan with near-constant flyovers of fighter jets and drones. Beijing has increased the frequency and scale of its amphibious exercises, so much so that it is getting hard to know what is a run-of-the-mill military drill, and what might be the start of the real thing: a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. 如果我們必須選擇一個年份，那就2027年吧。想像一下，中國正在用戰鬥機和無人機近乎持續地飛越台灣騷擾台灣。北京增加了兩棲演習的頻率和規模，以至於人們越來越難以知道什麼是普通的軍事演習，以及什麼可能是真正的演習：全面的軍事演習入侵台灣。
Because in this hypothetical future, the real thing is looking increasingly possible. 因為在這個假設的未來，真實的事情看起來越來越有可能。
In it, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has spoken with urgency about the country’s “national rejuvenation” — that is, when Taiwan, which China views as a separatist province, is “reunified” with the mainland. The United States and its allies are promising an unwavering response to any Chinese military escalation, without saying exactly what that entails. Taiwan says it seeks peace, but will defend itself from attack if necessary. US and Chinese diplomats are shuttling through Singapore, and Bali, seeking an offramp, even as US intelligence suggests Xi wants to act, and act now. 中國領導人習近平在其中迫切地談到了國家的「民族復興」——即中國視為分裂省份的台灣與大陸「統一」。美國及其盟國承諾對中國的任何軍事升級做出堅定不移的回應，但沒有具體說明這意味著什麼。台灣表示尋求和平，但如有必要，將保衛自己免受攻擊。美國和中國的外交官正在新加坡和峇里島間穿梭，尋找出路，儘管美國情報顯示習近平想要採取行動，而且是現在就會採取行動。
Then, Xi does. A massive cyber assault overwhelms Taiwan’s networks, immobilizing critical infrastructure. Chinese ships sever Taiwan’s undersea cables, and with it communication among its islands. Missiles strike Taiwanese government and military sites, the opening salvo to the large-scale amphibious assault that China was practicing in full view of the world. 然後，習近平就這麼做了。大規模網路攻擊淹沒了台灣的網絡，導致關鍵基礎設施癱瘓。中國船隻切斷了台灣的海底電纜以及台灣島嶼之間的通訊。飛彈襲擊了台灣政府和軍事設施，這是中國在全世界眾目睽睽之下進行的大規模兩棲攻擊的開端。
The United States will now have to decide if the promised unwavering response means defending Taiwan. If the president and Congress decide yes, America’s national security interests demand a US military intervention, then he (because it’s probably still going to be a he) has another call to make. This one is to Japan, the US’s key ally, to ask some version of the question: Will you let us use our military bases? 。美國現在必須決定承諾的堅定回應是否意味著保衛台灣。如果總統和國會決定是YES，美國的國家安全利益要求美國進行軍事干預，那麼他（因為可能仍然是他）還有另一個呼籲要做。這次是向美國的主要盟友日本提出某種版本的問題：你會讓我們使用我們的軍事基地嗎？
On the other end of the line is the Japanese prime minister, who knows that the US has tens of thousands of troops stationed at 85 military facilities on Japanese territory, a foundation of the security alliance between the two countries. Who also knows China has a likely arsenal of some 1,000 medium-range ballistic missiles that could target those US bases, and by extension, the cities of Japan and its 127 million citizens. Who knows that Japan’s westernmost island is only about 70 miles from Taiwan. Who knows that whatever decision he or she makes, it could very well decide the outcome of any war before it’s barely begun. 電話的另一端是日本首相，他知道美國在日本領土上的85個軍事設施駐紮著數萬名軍隊，這是兩國安全同盟的基礎。誰也都知道中國可能擁有約1,000枚中程彈道飛彈，可以瞄準這些美國基地，進而瞄準日本城市及其1.27億公民。誰知道日本最西邊的島嶼距離台灣只有70英哩左右。誰都知道，無論他或她做出什麼決定，都可能在戰爭剛開始之前就決定戰爭的結果。
What does Japan do? 日本會做什麼？
Like it’d tell you now. 我現在將告訴你。
Why Japan may be the key to any real war over Taiwan 為什麼日本可能是任何真正的台灣戰爭的關鍵
It is not 2027. Even if it were, it is not a foregone conclusion that China would be ready and willing to mount a costly full-on invasion of Taiwan by then. If you ask plenty of sober-minded experts today, it’s not even highly probable. Xi reportedly told President Joe Biden in November that China did not have a plan for military action in Taiwan in 2027 or 2035. 現在不是2027年。即使是，中國到那時也不會準備好並願意對台灣發動代價高昂的全面入侵，這也不是定局。如果你今天問很多頭腦清醒的專家，這種可能性甚至不大。據報導，習近平去年11月告訴拜登總統，中國沒有計劃在2027年或2035年對台灣採取軍事行動。
So maybe it won’t happen in the 2030s, or even the 2040s or by 2050 — some of the other estimates floating out there as to when China could attack Taiwan. Ideally, China would never. China has said that it seeks a “peaceful reunification,” though they have not ruled out achieving one by force. 因此，這種情況可能不會在2030年代、甚至2040年代或2050年發生——還有一些其他關於中國何時會攻擊台灣的估計。理想情況下，中國永遠不會。中國表示尋求“「和平統一」，但不排除透過武力實現統一。
How we reported this story 我們如何報導這個故事
Jen Kirby spoke to more than two dozen experts and current and former officials in Japan, the United States, and Europe for this story. In November 2023, she spent a week in Tokyo asking key Japanese officials what they thought Japan might do in a Taiwan emergency. The on-the-ground reporting was made possible by a grant from the Foreign Press Center Japan. 珍·柯比 (Jen Kirby) 就這個故事採訪了日本、美國和歐洲的兩打專家以及現任和前任官員。
2023年11月，她在東京停留了一周，詢問日本主要官員，他們認為日本在台灣發生緊急情況時會採取什麼行動。實地報導是在日本外國新聞中心的資助下進行的。
Even then, a full-scale invasion may be the most extreme of all courses — there are plenty of ways China can use force or coercion against Taiwan that fall short of a storming-the-beaches-style assault. But Xi has made clear his vision of China is incomplete without Taiwan. “The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability,” he said in his recent New Year’s address. 即便如此，全面入侵可能是所有路線中最極端的——中國可以透過多種方式對台灣使用武力或脅迫，但這些方式都比猛攻海灘式的攻擊要好。但習近平明確表示，如果沒有台灣，他對中國的願景是不完整的。「祖國統一是歷史的必然，」他在最近的新年致詞中說。
Taiwan increasingly opposes unification with China, and the majority of people in Taiwan want to preserve a version of the status quo. Lai Ching-te won Taiwan’s January presidential election on a platform of preserving Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty, and that is likely to keep Taipei moving closer to Washington than Beijing. US and China relations may have thawed a bit since their spy balloon nadir last year, but both US parties see China’s rapid-paced military buildup and geopolitical ambitions as a threat to America. The Biden administration has cultivated and deepened its partnership and security ties in the Indo-Pacific, and though it may not say so explicitly, it certainly looks like a coalition to deter China. 台灣越來越反對與中國統一，大多數台灣人希望維持現狀。賴清德在維護台灣民主和主權的綱領下贏得了台灣一月份的總統選舉，這可能會讓台北與華盛頓的關係變得更加密切，而不是與北京的關係。中美關係自去年間諜氣球降到最低點以來可能有所緩和，但美國兩黨都將中國快速的軍事建設和地緣政治野心視為對美國的威脅。拜登政府已經培育並深化了在印太地區的夥伴關係和安全關係，儘管它可能沒有明確表示，但它看起來確實像是一個威懾中國的聯盟。
Which is why, even if an invasion is unlikely, or even decades away, the question — What might Japan do if China invades Taiwan, unprovoked? — has become more urgent. Japan’s answer could shape how the US prepares for any armed confrontation over Taiwan, its outcome, and whatever world emerges after. 這就是為什麼，即使入侵不太可能，甚至幾十年後，問題仍然存在：如果中國無端入侵台灣，日本會做什麼？——變得更加緊迫。日本的答案可能會影響美國如何準備應對台灣問題的任何武裝對抗、其結果以及之後出現的世界。
Whether it wanted to or not, Japan itself cannot intervene to defend Taiwan. Japan’s post-World War II constitution renounces war, and so its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are just that, a military that exists to defend its territory. (Japan has, especially in recent years, pushed against those constitutional parameters.) 無論日本願意與否，它自己都無法介入保衛台灣。日本二戰後憲法放棄戰爭，因此其自衛隊（SDF）就是一支為保衛其領土而存在的軍隊。（日本，特別是近年來，一直在反對這些憲法限制。）
What Japan does have is a security alliance with the United States. This treaty commits the US to defend Japan in the event of an attack on its soil, in exchange for America’s use of Japanese territory for “the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” That is, military bases. About 55,000 US forces are based in Japan, and US military facilities span 77,000 acres, the majority in Okinawa prefecture. In any war with Taiwan, the US would need to deploy naval vessels and fighter jets from these locations. 日本所擁有的是與美國的安全聯盟。該條約承諾，如果日本領土受到攻擊，美國將保衛日本，以換取美國使用日本領土，以「為日本的安全和維護遠東的國際和平與安全做出貢獻。」也就是軍事基地。大約有55,000名美軍駐紮在日本，美軍設施佔地77,000英畝，其中大部分位於沖繩縣。在與台灣的任何戰爭中，美國都需要從這些地點部署海軍艦艇和戰鬥機。
But the use of these military bases requires prior consultation: Japan must grant the US permission to use these facilities in combat beyond the defense of Japan. If Taiwan invades, and the US wants to intervene, Japan has its own dilemma: to say yes potentially signs Japan up for war, leaving itself vulnerable to attack from China. To say no could unravel the US-Japan alliance, leaving itself vulnerable by cutting off its only security guarantor. 但使用這些軍事基地需要事先協商：日本必須授予美國許可，才能將這些設施用於日本防衛以外的戰鬥。如果台灣入侵，而美國想要干預，日本也面臨著自己的困境：如果說「是」，日本可能會加入戰爭，從而容易受到中國的攻擊。說「不」可能會瓦解美日同盟，從而使美日同盟因切斷其唯一的安全保證而變得脆弱。
If Japan does say no, seeing the risks to itself and its population as too great, in any fight with China, the US is probably toast. The American military would likely be crushed if it intervened without being able to deploy its assets from Japan, but potentially strategically defeated if it did not intervene at all. 如果日本認為自己及其人民面臨的風險太大而拒絕，那麼在與中國的任何戰鬥中，美國可能會完蛋。如果美國軍隊在無法從日本部署其軍事資產的情況下進行干預，它可能會被壓垮，但如果它根本不干預，則可能會在戰略上被擊敗。
“China succeeding in taking over Taiwan should mean the US is out, which means Chinese hegemony, at least in this region, is expanding,” said Yoshihide Soeya, professor emeritus of international relations at Keio University. “That would mean that Japan would have to think of the national strategy to live under such Chinese influence, and I don’t know if under that scenario, if the US-Japan Alliance is still there. Maybe not — and then it’s a totally different world.” 「中國成功接管台灣應該意味著美國已經出局，這意味著中國的霸權，至少在這個地區，正在擴大，」慶應義塾大學國際關係名譽教授添谷芳秀表示。「這意味著日本必須考慮在中國的影響下生存的國家戰略，我不知道在這種情況下，美日同盟是否仍然存在。也許不是——然後那就是一個完全不同的世界了。」
Even if Japan says yes and lets the US use its bases, it is no guarantee of an unchanged world. Some of that may depend on exactly what type of affirmative answer Japan gives. It could just grant access to the bases and attempt to remain out of the battle — though that may be as much China’s decision as Japan’s. In addition to granting that access, Japan could choose to provide logistical or operational support to the US from the start. That’s an outcome that some wargames, including one published last year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), suggest would considerably improve the US and its allies’ fortunes, giving them a chance to fend off China. But it would come at costs and heavy losses, for the United States and for Japan. 即使日本答應並允許美國使用其基地，也不能保證世界不會改變。其中一些可能取決於日本給出何種類型的肯定答案。它可能只是允許進入這些基地，並試圖保持在戰鬥之外——儘管這可能是中國和日本的決定。除了給予美國准入之外，日本還可以選擇從一開始就向美國提供後勤或行動支援。一些兵棋推演，包括戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）去年發布的兵棋推演，顯示這項結果將大大改善美國及其盟國的命運，讓他們有機會抵禦中國。但對於美國和日本來說，這都會付出代價並遭受重大損失。
“The question is: Would we be willing to sacrifice ourselves to defend Taiwan?” said Narushige Michishita, executive vice president and professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan. 「問題是：我們願意犧牲自己來保衛台灣嗎？」日本國家政策研究所（GRIPS）常務副院長兼教授道下德成（Narushige Michishita）說。
“That’s partly why — although I think Japan is severely becoming more committed to the defense of Taiwan — Japan has never said, or the government has never, ever said: ‘We will defend Taiwan,’” Michishita added. 「這就是為什麼——儘管我認為日本正在變得更加致力於保衛台灣——日本從未說過，或者說政府從未說過：『我們將保衛台灣』，」道下補充道。
“The Japanese government is walking a tightrope.” 「日本政府正在走鋼索。」
How Japan got here 日本是如何走到這一步的
“I myself have a strong sense of urgency that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said in spring 2022. 日本首相岸田文雄在2022年春季表示：「我本人有一種強烈的緊迫感，今天的烏克蘭可能會成為明天的東亞。」
Japan saw the war in Ukraine as both a wake-up call and an opportunity. Russia’s full-scale invasion rocked the rules-based international order, an order that Japan sees as integral to its own political and economic security interests. Japan also saw its own vulnerability reflected back in Russia’s assault, and it started thinking more seriously about what it might need as a middle power if similarly threatened. “Japan would need resiliency and sustainability. This is the lesson learned from Ukraine,” said Koichi Isobe, a retired lieutenant general with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. 日本將烏克蘭戰爭視為警鐘和機會。俄羅斯的全面入侵動搖了基於規則的國際秩序，日本認為這項秩序是其自身政治和經濟安全利益不可或缺的一部分。日本也看到了自己的脆弱性在俄羅斯的攻擊中得到了體現，它開始更認真地思考如果受到同樣的威脅，作為一個中等強國可能需要什麼。「日本需要韌性和永續性。這是從烏克蘭學到的教訓。」日本自衛隊退休中將磯部晃一說。
In December 2022, Japan articulated this vision when it updated its national security and defense strategies and made commitments to significantly expand its defense budget over the next five years. Japan also made plans to invest in counter-strike capabilities as a deterrent to outside attacks. 2022年12月，日本在更新國家安全和防衛戰略時闡明了這個願景，並承諾在未來五年大幅擴大國防預算。日本也計劃投資反恐能力，以威懾外部攻擊。
“Post-war Japan has long refrained from playing or even seeking a role in geopolitics, let alone the military domain,” Soeya said. But these documents focus on that agenda, and put Japan’s defense capabilities as a central component of coping with an unpredictable and chaotic world. 「戰後日本長期以來一直避免在地緣政治中扮演甚至尋求角色，更不用說軍事領域了，」添谷說。但這些文件重點關注這項議程，並將日本的防衛能力視為應對不可預測和混亂世界的核心組成部分。
“In terms of emphasis on key elements, it’s a paradigm shift,” Soeya added. 「就對關鍵要素的重視而言，這是一種典範移轉，」添谷補充道。
This shift was dramatic, but the foundations were already in place. Japan, especially under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, had invested more in its military and expanded its defense capabilities and partnerships. The Ukraine war reinforced the reality Japan already recognized: China’s rise, North Korea’s threats, and the US’s rising America First posture meant Japan needed to be proactive about strengthening and protecting its security and interests amid such global instability. 這一轉變是戲劇性的，但基礎已經就位了。日本，特別是在前首相安倍晉三的領導下，加強了軍事投資，擴大了防衛能力和夥伴關係。烏克蘭戰爭強化了日本已經認識到的現實：中國的崛起、朝鮮的威脅以及美國日益崛起的美國優先姿態意味著日本需要在全球不穩定的情況下積極主動地加強和保護其安全和利益。
America is Japan’s essential ally. The election of Donald Trump did not undo it, so much as convince Japan that it needed to prepare for a world where America was more isolationist, more unpredictable, and a weaker power, especially against an ascendant China. Japan would need to get better at defending itself. And it probably needed to hedge and foster bonds with other like-minded countries in the region and beyond — like deepening ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All of this wasn’t — couldn’t be — a strategy to replace the US. In preparing to fight for itself, Japan was equalizing the partnership a bit more, showing the US how much more of a capable, and essential, partner it could be. 美國是日本重要的盟友。唐納德·川普的當選並沒有消除這一局面，甚至讓日本相信，它需要為一個美國更加孤立主義、更加不可預測且實力較弱的世界做好準備，尤其是在對抗崛起的中國時。日本需要更保衛自己。它可能需要與該地區及其他地區其他志同道合的國家進行避險並加強聯繫，例如深化與北大西洋公約組織（NATO）的關係。所有這一切都不是——也不可能是——取代美國的戰略。為了準備捍衛自身，日本正在更加平等地對待夥伴關係，向美國展示它可以成為一個多麼有能力、多麼重要的夥伴。
“I say this more dramatically than literally,” US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel told Vox in November about both the US and Japan national security strategies, “but we could have written theirs, and they could have written ours. That’s how closely aligned they are on North Korea, China, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait. [They’re] just incredibly complementary documents.” 美國駐日本大使拉姆·伊曼紐爾(Rahm Emanuel)11月在談到美國和日本的國家安全戰略時對Vox 表示：「我說的這句話比字面意思更誇張，但我們可以擬定他們的，他們也可以擬定我們的。這就是他們在朝鮮、中國、南海、台灣海峽問題，在國家安全戰略上的高度一致性，它們是非常互補的文件。」
“I think we’re at the first iteration of a new chapter called alliance projection, and closing the chapter on alliance protection,” Emanuel added. 「我認為我們正處於一個被稱為『聯盟未來』的新篇章的第一次試行，並結束了『聯盟保護』的階段，」伊曼紐爾補充說。
These 2022 security documents (in total, three major ones), were an official coming out for this long-building policy. And in them, many saw that Japan was more obviously preparing for the potential it might be drawn into a war. “To me, it’s vividly clear that Japan is changing its course and getting committed to the defense of Taiwan,” Michishita said. 這些2022年的安全文件（總共三個主要文件），是官方針對這項長期建設政策而推出的。在其中，許多人看到日本顯然正在為可能捲入戰爭的可能性做好準備。「對我來說，很明顯日本正在改變路線並致力於保衛台灣，」道下說。 Japan getting more committed to the defense of Taiwan is not quite the same as an actual commitment. Japan has an interest in “strategic ambiguity,” as does the United States, which also tries (and sometimes fails) to pursue a similar course on Taiwan. But Japan’s defense investments and new national security strategy are a sign it knows it needs to prepare for a possible Taiwan emergency. 日本更致力於保衛台灣，這與實際的承諾並不完全相同。日本對「戰略模糊性」感興趣，美國也如此，美國也試圖（有時失敗）在台灣問題上採取類似的做法。但日本的國防投資和新的國家安全戰略表明，它知道需要為台灣可能的緊急情況做好準備。
The United States is central to all of it. Many current and former government and military officials told me Japan recognizes that this current security order is tenuous — but it still sees it as the best one it’s got. Which is also the strongest case for Japan granting permission to the US to use its bases. Otherwise, it all goes away. 美國是這一切的核心。許多現任和前任政府和軍方官員告訴我，日本認識到當前的安全秩序是脆弱的，但它仍然認為它是最好的安全秩序。這也是日本允許美國使用基地的最有力的理由。否則，一切都會消失。
“If the US requests for support from Japan, and if Japan turns it down, then the Japan-US alliance will collapse,” said Kyoji Yanagisawa, director of the International Geopolitics Institute Japan and former defense official who served decades in the Japanese government. 日本國際地緣政治研究所所長、在日本政府任職數十年的前防衛官員柳澤協ニ表示，「如果美國請求日本提供支持，而日本拒絕了，那麼日美同盟就會崩潰。」
This is also why many see the idea that Japan could somehow sit out a Taiwan conflict implausible. “[A] Taiwan war is our war,” said Nobukatsu Kanehara, of Doshisha University, and former top adviser to Shinzo Abe. 這也是為什麼許多人認為日本可能以某種方式袖手旁觀台灣衝突的想法令人難以置信。「台灣戰爭是我們的戰爭（台灣有事即日本有事），」同志社大學、安倍晉三前高級顧問兼原信克說。
Japan’s territory would be too close to the conflict, leaving it vulnerable, both to potentially being caught in the crosshairs — or as a future target. China might want to expand, Isobe said, and it “might not stop at Taiwan.” 日本的領土距離衝突地區太近，使其容易受到攻擊，要不成為瞄準目標，要不成為未來的目標。磯部晃一說，中國可能想要擴張，而且「可能不會止步於台灣」。
Hirotaka Yamashita, a retired lieutenant general with the Ground Self-Defense Forces, pointed out that thousands of Taiwanese civilians will likely still seek to evacuate to safety, including to the islands that lay between Taiwan and Japan, on fishing boats, commercial vessels, or motor boats. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan, said Isamu Ueda, a Komeito representative and member of the committee on foreign affairs and defense in the Japanese legislature, will affect Japan, physically and economically — Japan, like so much of the rest of the world, is reliant on semiconductors and other supply chain inputs from both Taiwan and China. “It will destroy the international order in East Asia and in the Pacific region,” he said. 陸上自衛隊退役中將山下裕貴指出，數千名台灣平民可能仍會尋求安全撤離，包括乘坐漁船、商船或快艇，前往台灣和日本之間的島嶼。公明黨代表、日本立法機構外交和防衛委員會成員上田勇表示，中國接管台灣將在實體和經濟上對日本產生影響——日本和世界其他國家一樣，對台灣有依賴。來自台灣和中國大陸的半導體和其他供應鏈投入。「這將破壞東亞和太平洋地區的國際秩序，」他說。
All scenarios Japan wants to avoid. But it may still not avoid them, even if it grants US access to its bases. “Is Japan going to accept the missiles coming over to Japan in order to maintain the alliance — or to have the alliance collapse by turning down the request from the US?” Yanagisawa said. 日本希望避免的所有情況。但即使它允許美國進入其基地，它可能仍然無法避免它們。「日本會接受向日本運送飛彈以維持同盟關係，還是會拒絕美國的要求而導致同盟崩潰？」柳澤說。
Japan’s domestic politics are the big unknown 日本國內政治是一大未知數
If this all happens — if China launches an assault on Taiwan, if the US wants to intervene, if the missiles start flying — Japan will have to decide about the US bases. The US and Japan, as allies, will probably have talked about this scenario a lot, so Japan’s response probably won’t be a total surprise. But planning and preparations are one thing, the imminent threat of missiles landing on your territory is another. And any Japanese leader will ultimately have to decide whether to sell the public on the potential for inviting war against Japan. 如果這一切發生——如果中國對台灣發動攻擊，如果美國想要干預，如果飛彈開始飛行——日本將不得不就美國的基地做出決定。作為盟友，美國和日本可能會經常談論這種情況，因此日本的反應可能不會完全令人驚訝。但計劃和準備是一回事，導彈降落在你的領土上的迫在眉睫的威脅是另一回事。任何日本領導人最終都必須決定是否向公眾說明對日發動戰爭的可能性。
The military wargames may seem complex, but the political ones are even more so. The Japanese public has broadly negative views of China, but getting into war with Beijing is another issue. A recent survey conducted by a Stanford researcher showed that support for Japanese involvement in a Taiwan emergency declined if China promised not to attack Japan. Plenty of officials and military experts pointed out to me it would be foolish to trust China. And support for any Japanese military involvement increases if China threatens Japan, or any of its outlying islands. But the tradeoff that a Japanese leader has to make is a possible future threat of war versus an imminent one. 軍事兵棋推演看似複雜，但政治推演更是如此。日本民眾對中國普遍持負面看法，但與北京開戰則是另一個問題。史丹佛大學研究人員最近進行的一項調查顯示，如果中國承諾不攻擊日本，對日本介入台灣緊急情況的支持就會下降。許多官員和軍事專家向我指出，相信中國是愚蠢的。如果中國威脅日本或其任何離島，對日本軍事介入的支持就會增加。但日本領導人必須在未來可能的戰爭威脅與迫在眉睫的戰爭威脅之間做出權衡。
China is likely to be aware of this and may even be starting to try to sow these fears. A Chinese propaganda video last year appeared to threaten Japan with nukes if it sought to defend Taiwan, a particularly potent threat given Japan’s history. 中國可能意識到了這一點，甚至可能開始試圖散播這些恐懼。去年中國的宣傳影片似乎用核武威脅日本，如果日本試圖保衛台灣。考慮到日本的歷史，這是一個特別有力的威脅。
Many experts and officials I talked to thought this was a huge reason why Japan was walking this tightrope on the Taiwan emergency question: There is likely a huge gap between what the political elites believe, and what the public sees. “Japanese politicians, when talking about defense policies to the public, they always say that we are buying missiles to protect people’s lives,” Yanagisawa said. “But that’s wrong because national defense is essentially the people costing their lives to defend their country.” 我採訪過的許多專家和官員認為，這是日本在台灣緊急問題上走鋼索的一個重要原因：政治菁英的看法和公眾的看法之間可能存在巨大差距。柳澤說：「日本政界人士在向公眾談論國防政策時，總是說我們購買導彈是為了保護人民的生命。」「但這是錯誤的，因為國防本質上是人民為保衛國家而付出生命的代價。」
“That narrative lacks reality,” he added, “so I’m really worried what is going to happen when Japan is in an emergency.” 「這種說法缺乏現實性，」他補充道，「所以我真的很擔心日本陷入緊急狀態時會發生什麼。」
The Japanese public most aware of the trade-offs are likely those already familiar with the US presence. The majority of US military facilities are in the islands of the southern Okinawa prefecture, where public disapproval of military bases is as high as 70 percent. US officials have tried to take steps to change that. But it remains true that people in these areas, which are most at-risk in Japan given their proximity to US facilities, are also those who already have a skeptical view of the US presence — and it’s unclear how that may sway over Japan’s larger national security decisions. 最了解這種權衡的日本公眾可能是那些已經熟悉美國存在的人。美軍的大部分軍事設施都位於沖繩縣南部的島嶼，那裡的民眾對軍事基地的不滿高達70%。美國官員已經試圖採取措施改變這種狀況。但事實仍然是，這些地區的人們在日本的風險最大地區，因為它們靠近美國設施，但他們也已經對美國的存在持懷疑態度——目前還不清楚這可能會如何影響日本更大的國家安全決策。
Are we asking the right questions about Taiwan — and Japan? 我們是否就台灣和日本提出了正確的問題？
Asking what Japan might do if China invades Taiwan is a bit of a black-and-white question in a situation that has few of them. There is a whole range of options between the current status quo and a full-scale invasion. China could potentially seize an outlying Taiwanese island — think Russia in Crimea in 2014. Beijing might keep at its gray-zone tactics or attempt a blockade. Tensions could escalate, and maybe there’s a miscalculation or unintentional confrontation between the US and China that leads to a larger standoff. Even in an invasion, the politics, the leaders, the timing, what is happening in the rest of the world — all of it will shape the answer to that question. 在這樣的情況下，如果中國入侵台灣，日本可能會做什麼，這有點像是個非黑即白的問題。在維持現狀和全面入侵之間有許多選擇。中國有可能奪取台灣的一個偏遠島嶼——想想2014年俄羅斯在克里米亞的情況。北京可能會繼續採取灰色地帶策略或嘗試封鎖。緊張局勢可能升級，美中之間可能出現誤判或擦槍走火，導致更嚴重的對峙。即使在入侵中，政治、領導人、時機、世界其他地區正在發生的事情等等——所有這些都將決定這個問題的答案。
Still, many experts and current and former officials I spoke to, both in Japan and the US, believe Japan’s stance on Taiwan is still a question worth asking. You plan and prepare for war so you don’t have to go to it — and knowing what kind of war it might be enhances both. “If your goal is to deter, you need the capability plus the credibility,” said retired US Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery. “The belief that Japan will be an active participant in combat operations is a really big element in this in a positive way.” 儘管如此，我採訪過的日本和美國的許多專家以及現任和前任官員都認為，日本對台灣的立場仍然是一個值得提出的問題。你為戰爭做好計劃和準備，這樣你就不必捲入戰爭——並且知道它可能會是什麼樣的戰爭可以增強兩者的效果。「如果你的目標是威懾，你需要能力和信譽，」退休美國海軍少將馬克蒙哥馬利說。「相信日本將積極參與作戰行動，這確實是一個積極的重要因素。」
If Japan is going to at least grant access — which is, on the whole, experts’ most common response — then many thought both the US and Japan should take greater steps to prepare for it. In some ways, Japan is: In December, Tokyo approved an increase in its military budget and loosened a ban on lethal weapons exports, which will allow Japan to better coordinate on a couple of key weapons systems with the US and may also help boost the country’s defense industry. Japan is also developing a fighter jet with Italy and the United Kingdom. 如果日本至少要允許進入——總體說來，這是專家最常見的反應——那麼許多人認為美國和日本都應該採取更大的措施來為此做好準備。從某些方面來說，日本是：去年12月，東京批准增加軍事預算，並放寬了致命武器出口禁令，這將使日本能夠在幾個關鍵武器系統上與美國更協調，也可能有助於推動日本的發展國家的國防工業。日本也與義大利和英國一起開發戰鬥機。
At the same time, many experts pointed out that as ambitious as Japan’s moves may be, it’s still very much unclear whether the defense spending is enough if Japan’s military is drawn into a conflict over Taiwan. Spending alone also isn’t enough: It would also require thinking about what you might need to fight a war alongside the US, such as improving interoperability or communication between forces, and hardening infrastructure on military bases and civilian infrastructure to protect against Chinese missiles. Quiet initiatives are happening, for example, to get Japanese civilian shipyards to repair US naval ships, which saves money now, but would be very handy in the event of a conflict. 同時，許多專家指出，儘管日本的舉動可能非常雄心勃勃，但如果日本軍隊捲入台灣問題的衝突，防衛開支是否足夠仍是一個非常明確的問題。僅支出也是不夠的：還需要考慮與美國並肩作戰可能需要什麼，例如改善部隊之間的互通性或通信，以及加固軍事基地和民用基礎設施以防範中國導彈。例如，正在悄悄採取行動，讓日本民用造船廠修理美國海軍艦艇，這在目前可以節省資金，但在衝突時會非常方便。
Yet deterrence is itself a tricky and unpredictable calculation. The more committed, the better the credibility. But it can also be an accelerant, entrapping countries on a path to miscalculation, and war. 然而威懾本身就是一個棘手且不可預測的計算。越堅定，越可信。但也可能成為一種助燃劑，使各國陷入誤判和戰爭。
“My frustration has to do with the fact that if you’re worried about those worst-case scenarios, then that should motivate you to move in the other direction — trying to talk about and think about efforts to prevent this collision course from nearing realization,” Soeya said. 「我的挫敗感與以下的事實有關：如果你擔心那些最壞的情況，那麼這應該會激勵你朝另一個方向前進——嘗試談論和思考如何為防止碰撞過程接近實現而做出努力，」添谷說。
And if the collision course is realized, if China and the US do go to war over Taiwan, no choice Japan makes will single-handedly solve it. But all parties do have an interest in preventing it. 如果碰撞路線發生，如果中美真的因台灣問題開戰，日本做出的任何選擇都無法單槍匹馬解決問題。但阻止這種情況發生確實符合各方利益。
“There is no winner or loser in a war,” said Yamashita. “What is left is only the destroyed land and damage to people like what we see today in Ukraine and Israel. A Taiwan emergency needs to be averted.” 「戰爭中沒有贏家或輸家，」山下說。「剩下的只是被摧毀的土地和對人民的傷害，就像我們今天在烏克蘭和以色列看到的那樣。需要避免台灣陷入緊急狀態。”
This reporting was made possible by a grant from the Foreign Press Center Japan.本報導是在日本外國新聞中心的資助下完成的。
