【Comment】
英國發表這聲明的10月29日時點,是即將舉行第八輪的會談。談判已經失敗。
根據會談結果,達賴對於自己的「中間路線」已經灰心,而且也不再輪迴到世間。意思是,達賴轉世的傳承或文化將從此中斷,圖博文化正在死亡。
又根據11月15日的電視新聞,中國統戰部朱維群說:歷史上從未有達賴所說的「大西藏區」存在,又說說好聽的是說達賴的提案是「不合時宜的」,說不好聽的是「沒有資格」。
看起來,英國外相正如同當年的張伯倫一樣。英國「適時」的聲明,削弱了達賴與北京的會談能力與地位,失敗是必然的。但,卻會讓中國與印度的邊界糾紛成功吧?
聯合王國外相對圖博之書面聲明(2008.10.29) ■雲程譯
David Miliband對中國政府與達賴喇嘛代表在圖博舉行的會談加以評論。書面的聲明如下:
中國政府與達賴喇嘛代表在圖博新一回合的對談,即將舉行。此對談對圖博的未來極為重要。他們形成一個可以實際上進行解決雙方歧見的論壇。
中國政府說他們很重視此對談,期待有正面的結果。對此對談已設下條件,我們相信達賴喇嘛已經同意。達賴喇嘛澄清過,他並不尋求分離或獨立。他不斷的說,他是尋求在中國憲法架構下對圖博情勢的解決方案,這是他在5月24日他訪問聯合王國時接受金融時報訪問中所明示的一點。他說:他並「不尋求分離,也不尋求獨立,只是在中國憲法的架構下,一個有意義的真正的圖博自治。」他明白反對使用暴力。
英國政府已經清楚表示對於圖博人民的承諾。我們持續深切關心當地的人權狀況。我的首相在春天與溫總理,以及兩人在北京奧運再度會面時的討論中表達此關切。當三月發生暴亂時我與外交部楊部長會面時,也重申此點。我們持續重申我們期待見到圖博的人權受到尊重,包括尊重其不同的文化、語言、重統和宗教。我們的利益並不是恢復60年前的秩序,達賴喇嘛自己也說無意恢復原狀。
我們同樣關切直接由今年春天的暴亂所引起的即刻議題,包括事後仍舊在拘禁中的人、對宗教活動持續增加的限制,以及限制外交官和記者自由訪問圖博自治區等情勢。這些議題強化了長久以來當地政府對圖博人權的不安。
其他國家也表達類似的看法。但我們的立場是不一樣的是基於歷史的原因,而這對現在是非常重要的:對於圖博是否為中國的一部份,以及是否事實上我們心懷中國分裂的意圖,我們的正式立場不合乎時代。我們不是這樣的。
我們突破的能力有時會受到聯合王國在20世紀初對圖博地位採取的立場的干擾,這是當時基於地緣政治的立場。我們承認中國對圖博的「特別地位」,是由過時的宗主權發展出來的。一些人基於此質疑我們的企圖,並聲稱我們拒絕中國在其大片領土上的主權。我們對中國政府公開的聲明,我們不支持圖博獨立。就如同每一個歐盟國家,以及美國一樣,我們視圖博是中華人民共和國的一部份。我們的利益是長期的穩定,這穩定只能經由尊重人權與給予圖博人更大的自治而達成。
Written Ministerial Statement on Tibet (29/10/2008)
David Miliband commented on the discussions taking place on Tibet between the Chinese Government and representatives of the Dalai Lama. In a Written Ministerial Statement he said:
'A new round of talks on Tibet between the Chinese Government and representatives of the Dalai Lama is likely to take place shortly. These talks are hugely important for the future of Tibet. They provide the only forum in which there is any realistic possibility of progress to resolve the differences between the parties involved.
The Chinese Government has said that it is serious about dialogue and that it hopes for a positive outcome. It has set conditions for dialogue which we believe the Dalai Lama has met. The Dalai Lama has made clear that he is not seeking separation or independence. He has said repeatedly that he is seeking a resolution to the situation of Tibet within the framework of the Chinese constitution, a point he made explicitly in an interview with the Financial Times on 24 May during his visit to the United Kingdom. He said: he was "not seeking separation, not seeking independence, but within the framework of the Chinese Constitution, meaningful realistic autonomy [for Tibetans]". He has maintained a clear opposition to violence.
The British Government has a strong interest in the dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama's representatives, although we are not a party to it. No government which is committed to promoting international respect for human rights can remain silent on the issue of Tibet, or disinterested in a solution to its problems.
Britain has been clear under this Government about our commitment to the people of Tibet. We remain deeply concerned about the human rights situation there. My Rt. hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out our concerns to Premier Wen during discussions in the spring and again when they met in Beijing during the Olympic Games. I have made the same point to Foreign Minister Yang on a number of occasions since the unrest in March this year in Tibet. We have consistently made clear that we want to see the human rights of the Tibetan people respected, including through respect for their distinct culture, language, traditions and religions. Our interest is not in restoring an order which existed 60 years ago and which the Dalai Lama himself has said he does not seek to restore.
We are also concerned at more immediate issues arising directly from the unrest of this spring, including the situation of those who remain in detention following the unrest, the increased constraints on religious activity, and the limitations on free access to the Tibetan Autonomous Region by diplomats and journalists. These issues reinforce long-held unease on the part of the Government about the underlying human rights situation in Tibet.
Other countries have made similar points. But our position is unusual for one reason of history that has been imported into the present: the anachronism of our formal position on whether Tibet is part of China, and whether in fact we harbour continued designs to see the break up of China. We do not.
Our ability to get our points across has sometimes been clouded by the position the UK took at the start of the 20th century on the status of Tibet, a position based on the geo-politics of the time. Our recognition of China's "special position" in Tibet developed from the outdated concept of suzerainty. Some have used this to cast doubt on the aims we are pursuing and to claim that we are denying Chinese sovereignty over a large part of its own territory. We have made clear to the Chinese Government, and publicly, that we do not support Tibetan independence. Like every other EU member state, and the United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China. Our interest is in long term stability, which can only be achieved through respect for human rights and greater autonomy for the Tibetans.'
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