歐巴馬轉向：退卻、示好，或引導？

【Comment】

The US President monopolizes the plenary power of foreign affairs and national defense.  The cabinet reshuffle should not influence the second-term-President’s policy or the national strategy as a whole, unless the President wants to. 
Obama’s rebalancing policy toward Asia, which involves technological changes, US budget cuts, global political and economic evolutions, commitments and military investments to US allies, etc., refers to long-term national interests rather than an administration policy. 
The question is: why does the US shift her national strategy so drastically and frivolously in less than two years.  The shift might be interpreted by Beijing as a conciliatory retreat.
Yet the cost for the US strategy shift might be too high while Beijing is re-organizing her institutions and, in particular, strengthening her “Second Navy,” the China Coast Guard, as her fist of brinkmanship against Japanese Coast Guard.  The US paid a similar high price to normalize China during the 1970s under the plots of Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration, and Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Young US tends to surrender her advantages to elder Beijing in terms of history.  It seems that the US has reorganized China’s arbitrary historical viewpoints.
On the other hand, another Washington Post article, by its contributing editor Jim Hoagland, suggested that Obama’s strategy shift might aim to create a friendly environment with Xi Jin-ping, and could later render China manageable with a set of complications and potential punishments designed by Obama.    revised on 2013012

美國外交與國防兩權掌握在總統手中，國務卿與國防部長只是總統的幕僚。第二任期的總統外交與國防策略不至於僅僅因幕僚的更替而有大改變，特別是，不應影響國家戰略。歐巴馬的重視（重返或在平衡）亞洲，並不是政權的策略，而是國家長期戰略的調整（牽涉到技術革新、預算長期減少與全球政經演變、對盟國的條約承諾與投資等結構因素）。為何會產生戰略變化？若此為真，而且在中國整頓組織強化海洋機構成立有「第二海軍」可能能執行警察權的「海警局」之際，美國從亞洲撤退將重演尼克森（季辛吉）與卡特（范錫，Cyrus Vance；布里辛斯基，Zbigniew Brzezinski）付出過大的成本以成就美中正常化的歷史。看起來，要正確認識歷史的，原來是美國。當然，另一家《華盛頓郵報》的報導提及一種可能：創造與新上任的中國國家主席習近平領袖協商的條件，同時避免中國走向大家不願意見到的地步。

Inside the Ring: Asia pivot threatened◎Washington Times（2013.03.06）

National security officials in the military and at the Pentagon are voicing growing worries that the second Obama administration is preparing to jettison the new policy focus on Asia known as the "pivot" or rebalancing.

Evidence cited by these officials includes a recent Chinese government visitor who was told that the White House plans to kill the shift to Asia in mid-2013 as part of its conciliatory approach to China.  Beijing is the key, but unspoken, target of the major military and diplomatic effort to increase security in Asia and calm the fears of U.S. allies alarmed by what they see as the new Chinese hegemon in Asia.

The Obama administration so far has failed to criticize China for its years of cyberespionage attacks or even acknowledge publicly that China is conducting computer assaults.  The administration also has provided lukewarm support for key allies, as its low-key handling of visit last month by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe showed.

China is currently engaged in maritime disputes with most of its neighbors in Asia and is becoming increasingly aggressive in claiming control over vast areas of international waters that host vital shipping lanes used by energy-poor countries in the region.

A second troubling sign for the shift to Asia was the departure last month from the State Department of Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, a key policy player who was widely respected for his handling of most Asian policies and who is considered the father of the Asia pivot.

Mr. Campbell left last month to launch a new consulting firm called the Asia Group.

China's state-controlled media continue to ramp up criticism of the Asia pivot and especially the U.S. military element known as the Air Sea Battle Concept.  Official Chinese spokesmen have called the battle plan a stalking horse for what Beijing calls U.S. "containment" or "encirclement" of the growing regional communist power.

The Air Sea Battle Concept, unveiled from its classified roots in November 2011, seeks closer Navy and Air Force cooperation in the Pacific, along with closer alliances and joint training.  The plan also involves new weapons to counter what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area-denial weapons, such as China's anti-ship ballistic missiles, cyberwarfare capabilities and anti-satellite weapons.

However, with the budget cuts of the past four years and now the additional sequester reductions, officials say the outlook for funding the pivot and Air Sea Battle is dimming.

Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, told a House hearing Tuesday that the recent budget cuts have the potential to undermine the pivot "as our ability to operate and maintain our force is at increased risk."

Additionally, the new Secretary of State John F. Kerry and new Defense Secretary Charles Hagel both advocate conciliatory policies toward China and thus could abandon the pivot policy.

Mr. Hagel also could be influenced to drop the pivot by the Chinese military, which viewed him favorably in a recent report in the official PLA Daily newspaper.  The paper praised Mr. Hagel in a Feb. 28 story as "not a pacifist but [someone who] has always held a cautious attitude on the use of U.S. forces overseas."

The article written by Wang Zhengxu said Mr. Hagel favors abandoning what the author called a U.S. policy of treating states as either "friend or foe," and said Mr. Hagel "recognizes that the two sides have their differences but he points out that 'concentrating single-mindedly on common interests' is the key to the development of mutually profitable relations."

Asked by senators in written policy questions during his confirmation if he believes the Asia pivot is a "necessity," Mr. Hagel declined to say it was needed.  He said the policy "will require strong and continuous U.S. commitment" amid budget constraints.

A State Department official also avoided a direct answer when asked if the pivot is on the ropes.  The official told Inside the Ring that the Asia-Pacific region is a "strategic priority" and that "we will broaden and deepen our engagement in the region accordingly."

Nuclear forces warning

The commander of U.S. nuclear weapons forces told the House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that budget cuts under sequestration are not an immediate threat to readiness but will be in the future.

Gen. C. Robert Kehler, head of the Omaha, Neb.-based U.S. Strategic Command, known as Stratcom, warned of a cascade of problems to come.  He said strategic bomber flying hours will be curtailed, personnel readiness will suffer, and needed modernization will be delayed if the automatic cuts that went into effect March 1 are allowed to stand.

"I'm pleased to report that Stratcom is capable of executing its assigned mission responsibilities today," Gen. Kehler said.  "However, given the potential impact fiscal uncertainty and declining resources could have on Stratcom, I am concerned that I may not be able to say the same in six months or a year."

Because the budget cuts must be made across the board, the command will not be protected, he said.

Specific impact currently is not clear, Gen. Kehler said, but he warned: "I just know that the readiness impacts are coming if unaddressed."

President Obama promised to spend $85 billion to upgrade aging U.S. nuclear forces and infrastructure as part of a deal to win Republican Senate support for the 2010 ratification of the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia.  But the funding was cut, and the White House did not demand that it be included in several budgets.

The stall in U.S. modernization comes as both China and Russia are engaged in large-scale nuclear modernization programs that include new missiles and warheads.

On further U.S. nuclear warhead reductions beyond the 2010 New START treaty, Gen. Kehler said any future cuts should be made bilaterally with Russia.

"I think in the long run, though, my view is that if we are going to engage in another conversation about reductions below New START, that should be done in a bilateral sense; that should be done with the Russians," he said.

The Obama administration is preparing to launch a new round of arms cuts that may include further reductions in strategic warheads and possibly tactical nuclear warheads.

Iran-China military ties

Two Iranian warships this week made a rare out-of-area deployment to the Pacific Ocean and docked at the Chinese port of Zhanjiang.

The visit highlights Beijing's military cooperation with rogue regimes. China also is under scrutiny for shipping weapons to Iran after the recent discovery in an Iranian sailboat of advanced anti-aircraft missiles intercepted en route to Yemen.

And last year, China was exposed for helping North Korea obtain mobile strategic-missile launchers for the new KN-08 ICBM, in violation of U.N. sanctions. (So far, the State Department has not held Beijing accountable for busting the sanctions.)

The Iranian warship visit and the illicit launcher transfer to North Korea have received scant media attention in the United States.

The docking of the Iranian warships, the Kharg and the frigate Sabalan, were Iran's first naval foray into the Pacific in three decades.  The port of Zhanjiang is the headquarters of the Chinese navy's South Sea Fleet, which has been behind the recent aggressiveness of China's military toward other nations in Southeast Asia.

Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the Sabalan has an interesting history.  The U.S. Navy attacked the Chinese frigate in April 1988 after the Sabalan launched several assaults on civilian shipping in the Persian Gulf.

The upgraded Sabalan is now armed with Chinese-designed C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles that were transferred from China to Iran in the 1990s.

"By allowing this naval visit, China is deliberately working to ease Iran's international military isolation," Mr. Fisher told Inside the Ring.

The Iranian naval visit to China also fits with Iran's long-standing plan to join the China-led, anti-U.S. Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a full member, he said.

"This would allow Iran to take part in the 'Peace Mission' series of military exercises that might eventually give Iran's army, navy and air force its first real-world international training experience," Mr. Fisher added.

China has provided Iran in recent years with technology used in multiple types of missiles, as well as manufacturing technology and advice on how to use the systems.  China also is helping Iran upgrade its fleet of U.S.-made F-4 fighters with new radar and advanced Chinese air-to-air missiles.

A State Department official had no immediate comment on the Iranian-Chinese naval cooperation.

On the Chinese missiles intercepted on an Iranian ship, the official said: "We continue to work with China to expand the areas of common interest and cooperation while pressing to resolve issues of concern."

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/6/inside-the-ring-asia-pivot-threatened/#ixzz2NBkwD6jB
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華時驚爆／對中修好 美國恐放棄重返亞洲戰略◎自由（2013.03.09）
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/mar/11/today-int3.htm

〔編譯陳成良／綜合報導〕美國總統歐巴馬連任後，美國「再平衡」戰略（重返亞洲）方向會不會改變，引發各方關注。對華府內幕一向靈通的華盛頓時報，日前在知名軍事記者葛茨（Bill Gertz）執筆的報導中指出，美國軍方與國防部主管國家安全的官員，對歐巴馬政府在第二任期內放棄此一稱為戰略「轉向」（pivot）或以亞洲為重心的政策的可能性，日益感到憂心。

報導指出，這些官員列舉的相關證據，包括美方最近在一名中國政府官員到訪時告訴對方，白宮計畫在今年年中放棄戰略轉向亞洲政策，以配合對中和解。其次，美國負責東亞與太平洋事務的助理國務卿坎貝爾上月卸任，他被視為美國重返亞洲政策的關鍵人物。而中共總書記習近平三月下旬接任中國國家主席後，首度外訪的國家選定俄羅斯，則被視為旨在回應歐巴馬的重返亞洲政策。

中國官方媒體不斷對美國戰略轉向亞洲政策大肆抨擊，特別是其中的軍事要素「海空一體戰概念」（Air Sea Battle Concept），指控此為美方「遏制」與「包圍」中國的障眼法。 海空一體作戰概念在二○一一年十一月公開，宗旨是加強美國海、空軍在太平洋地區合作，強化與盟邦關係和聯合訓練作業。然而，由於預算刪減，現又增加「自動減支」機制，使得戰略轉向和海空一體作戰構想日益難以取得經費，進而可能破壞此一重心轉移政策。

此外，新上任的國務卿凱瑞和新任國防部長哈格爾，都主張與中國和解，進而可能放棄此一戰略轉向。美國國會在審議哈格爾任命案時曾以書面詢問他，是否認為戰略轉向亞洲「勢在必行」，但哈格爾並未明確表態。

很多跡象顯示，歐巴馬政府正在調整重返亞洲政策。例如，迄今均未對中國多年來從事網路間諜活動提出批評，甚至沒有公開承認中國正從事網路攻擊。此外，歐巴馬政府對關鍵盟友的支持也不慍不火，從對上月日相安倍晉三訪美的低調處理中，亦可看出端倪。

Obama’s well-timed pivot to the Pacific◎WP（2013.03.09）http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jim-hoagland-obamas-well-timed-pivot-to-the-pacific/2013/03/08/45789e0e-8130-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html

By Jim Hoagland  The writer is a contributing editor to The Post.  His e-mail address is [email protected].

President Obama’s determination to get U.S. troops out of the Middle East and Central Asia is much clearer than are his purposes in repositioning U.S. military assets into the Pacific.  He seems at times to be a man fleeing a burning building looking for a calmer place to go.

But his geographic “pivot” can work if Obama defines his goals realistically and pursues them with a combination of firmness and opportunism.  By design or otherwise, he is locating pressure points and acquiring bargaining chips in Asia that can be useful in fashioning a more stable U.S. relationship with China.

This contrasts with his first-term failure in dealing with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other challenges where he armed himself only with good intentions and pious wishes before hitting walls of resistance.  No wonder he longs to wash his hands of the troubled, ungrateful Middle East (which will not let him move away that easily).

The president may be on steadier ground in Asia if his deft handling of the visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last month is any guide.  Obama underlined U.S. support for Japan without getting bogged down in details of the nasty islands dispute between Tokyo and Beijing.  And his warmth toward Abe was carefully calibrated to encourage the Japanese prime minister to shelve his own penchant for nationalistic rhetoric.

For pivots as well as people, timing is everything.  This turn fortunately coincides with the return to office of Abe — a tough-minded, activist politician capable of restraint when it is pushed onto him — and the arrival of the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping that was showcased at the People’s National Congress in Beijing this week.  More to the point, the continuing development by China of its maritime power, missile forces, anti-satellite capabilities and cyberspying creates the need for a new U.S. strategy in the Pacific.

It is now accepted at the Pentagon that an attack by Beijing on Taiwan could not be successfully turned back by U.S. planes and ships.  The dense deployment of missile batteries along the mainland Chinese coast has shifted the immediate balance of power, meaning that the United States will now depend on its ability to inflict massive retaliatory damage to deter China from crossing the Taiwan Strait.  “We can no longer be a shield,” says a senior military planner.  “We have to switch to being an effective spear.”

China’s growing ability to interfere with or destroy U.S. military satellites has also spurred the Navy’s development of a still-embryonic war-fighting doctrine known as the Air-Sea Battle concept — essentially an attempt to replicate at sea the coordination between air and armor defenses that NATO employed in Western Europe during the Cold War.

Hillary Clinton’s first-term diplomacy provides Obama with another opportunity.  She skillfully converted the anxiety of China’s neighbors over that country’s assertiveness into a common front.  Not long ago I heard Vietnam’s ambassador to Washington, Nguyen Quoc Cuong, publicly describe the U.S. military presence in the Pacific as “a stabilizing factor” in world politics.  Live long enough and you will see and hear everything, I suppose.

But these pressure points — solidarity with Japan, friendship with Asian nations upset over China’s growing shadow, expanding deployment of U.S. missile defense systems around China and putting a few more ships and Marines in the Pacific — exert mostly psychological pressure on China at this point.  They can be toned up, or down, depending on how conflictual the U.S.-China relationship becomes.

The Obama pivot has caught Beijing’s attention.  Chinese intellectuals complain that Washington has made no attempt to explain the Air-Sea Battle concept to Beijing or to engage in a strategic dialogue about China’s “vital interests” in the South China Sea.  The need for China to explain actions that have put its neighbors and Washington on edge — including its human rights abuses at home — is less evident to them.

That will have to change before there can be a meaningful leadership dialogue involving Xi and Obama.  But this time at least, Obama has improved his chances for success by introducing a set of complications and potential punishments that the new generation of Chinese leaders may prefer to avoid.

Xi has emphasized to at least one high-level foreign visitor that his cohort came of age during the turmoil of Mao’s Cultural Revolution.  They were either Red Guards persecuting their elders and siblings, victims of such persecution or in many cases both persecutor and victim at different phases of that vastly destructive period.  They have witnessed the price of taking gigantic risks with stability.

Wisely managed, Obama’s pivot gives the president a chance to test the still uncertain but not foreclosed possibilities of change with and in China.