不要圍堵中國，要和它合作◎紐約時報（2013.01.25）

不要圍堵中國，要和它合作◎紐約時報（2013.01.25）http://cn.nytimes.com/article/opinion/2013/01/29/c29nye/zh-hk/?pagemode=print

上周，《經濟學人》(The Economist)以東海島嶼爭端為理由，警告“中日兩國正在滑向戰爭邊緣”。這個論斷或許有點過於杞人憂天，但是當前的緊張局勢，為一些敦促實行“圍堵”（原譯文為遏制）中國政策的美國分析家提供了支持。近期訪問中國之時，我發現很多中國官員都認為，這樣的政策已經確立，並且已經成為了奧巴馬政府“轉向”亞洲政策的核心目標。這種想法讓我感到震驚。“轉向戰略是個非常愚蠢的選擇，”國際關係學教授金燦榮公開表示。他還說，“美國什麼都沒得到，只是惹惱了中國。中國是圍堵不了的。”圍堵政策是為另一個時代設計的，美國現在並沒有尋求，也不應當嘗試這種政策。在冷戰的初始階段，圍堵意味着對蘇聯進行經濟孤立，同時北大西洋公約組織這樣的地區性聯盟則要制止蘇聯的軍事擴張。後來，讓“圍堵之父”喬治·F·凱南(George F. Kennan)感到懊惱的是，這種觀點催生了“多米諾效應”理論，而後者促成了越南戰爭的升級。冷戰時期的圍堵政策指的是，幾乎不進行任何貿易，也幾乎不進行任何社會聯繫。然而，如今的中國絕非當時的蘇聯。中國並不是在爭奪世界霸權，而且美中之間不僅貿易額巨大，兩國還有大量學生和遊客的交流。我們設計了一個“融合但兩邊下注”(integrate but hedge)的策略，有點類似於羅納德·里根(Ronald Reag在克林頓政府任內，我1994年在國防部參與制定東亞戰略時，我們拒絕採取圍堵政策的原因有兩點。如果我們把中國視為敵人，它將來必定就會成為敵人。如果把中國當做朋友，就會為迎來更加和平的未來創造可能性。an)的“信任但核實”(trust but verify)策略。美國支持中國加入世貿組織(WTO)，並接受中國的商品和遊客。但在1996年的一份聲明中卻重申，美日兩國戰後簽訂的安全條約，是東亞地區穩定與繁榮的基礎。克林頓總統還開始着手改善與印度的關係，以沖抵中國崛起的影響。這個戰略贏得了跨黨派的支持。喬治·W·布殊總統(George W. Bush)在加深與中國的經濟往來的同時，持續改善與印度的關係。他的副國務卿羅伯特·B·佐利克(Robert B. Zoellick)曾闡明，美國將會接受中國的崛起，並將它當做“負責任的利益相關者”(responsible stakeholder)。奧巴馬面向亞洲的“再平衡”，涉及將海軍資源轉移到太平洋地區，但也涉及貿易、人權和外交舉措。作為奧巴馬的國家安全顧問，托馬斯·E·多尼隆(Thomas E. Donilon)去年11月說，美中關係中“既有合作的元素，又有競爭的元素”。亞洲不是鐵板一塊，亞洲內部的力量平衡應當成為我們戰略的關鍵。日本、印度、越南，以及其他國家，不希望中國主導一切，因而歡迎美國在該地區的存在。除非中國能夠成功地提升其“軟實力”，從而吸引盟友，否則中國軍事和經濟“硬”實力的提升，可能就會讓鄰國出於忌憚集結在一起，從而沖抵中國實力。相當規模的美國軍事和經濟存在，能夠幫助維持亞洲的力量平衡，塑造一個激勵中國開展合作的環境。在2008年至2009年的金融危機之後，一些中國人錯誤地相信，美國陷入了永久的衰落之中，而這提供了新的機遇。這想法的一個後果是，中國惡化了與日本、印度、韓國、越南、菲律賓的關係，這一失誤印證了“只有中國才能圍堵中國”的說法。但美國朝向亞洲的再平衡，不應太過強勢。我們不能忽視凱南對過度軍事化的警告，應確保中國不會感覺自己受到包圍或面臨危險。世界上最大的兩個經濟體，能夠合作抗擊氣候變化、流行病、網絡恐怖主義，以及核擴散，從而實現共同受益。隨着中國越來越依賴中東的能源，我們應當對海事監管展開磋商，確保船隻自由航行，並將中國包括在太平洋海軍演習中。我們應當幫助中國開發國內的能源，如頁岩氣，也應當鼓勵中國和日本重新啟動2008年的一項聯合勘探海底天然氣的計劃。我們應當闡明，如果中國滿足一定的標準，就能加入“泛太平洋夥伴關係協定”(Trans-Pacific Partnership)，這是一項針對環太平洋地區的自由貿易協定提議。應對一個崛起的中國，圍堵根本就不是一個合理的政策工具。實力的意義就是能夠獲得想要的結果。有時候，美國與別國合作時，比單純壓制別國時，實力更強。

Work With China, Don’t Contain It  by Joseph Nye

CITING an escalating dispute over islands in the East China Sea, The Economist warned last week that “China and Japan are sliding toward war.”  That assessment may be too alarmist, but the tensions have bolstered the efforts of some American analysts who have urged a policy to “contain” China.

During a recent visit to China, I was struck by how many Chinese officials believe such a policy is already in place and is the central purpose of President Obama’s “pivot” toward Asia.  “The pivot is a very stupid choice,” Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations, declared publicly.  “The United States has achieved nothing and only annoyed China. China can’t be contained,” he added.

Containment was designed for a different era, and it is not what the United States is, or should be, attempting now.  At the start of the cold war, containment meant economic isolation of the Soviets and regional alliances like NATO to deter Moscow’s military expansion.  Later, to the chagrin of George F. Kennan, the father of containment, the doctrine led to the “domino effect” theory behind the escalation of the Vietnam War.

Cold war containment involved virtually no trade and little social contact.  But China now is not what the Soviet Union was then.  It is not seeking global hegemony, and the United States not only has an immense trade with China but also huge exchanges of students and tourists.

When I worked on the Pentagon’s East Asia strategy in 1994, during the Clinton administration, we rejected the idea of containment for two reasons.  If we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing a future enemy.  If we treated China as a friend, we kept open the possibility of a more peaceful future.

We devised a strategy of “integrate but hedge” — something like Ronald Reagan’s “trust but verify.” America supported China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and accepted Chinese goods and visitors.  But a 1996 declaration reaffirmed that the postwar United States-Japan security treaty was the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia.  President Clinton also began to improve relations with India to counterbalance China’s rise.

This strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support.  President George W. Bush continued to improve relations with India, while deepening economic ties with China.  His deputy secretary of state, Robert B. Zoellick, made clear that America would accept the rise of China as a “responsible stakeholder.”

Mr. Obama’s “rebalancing” toward Asia involves moving naval resources to the Pacific, but also trade, human rights and diplomatic initiatives.  As his national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, said in November, the American-Chinese relationship “has elements of both cooperation and competition.”

Asia is not a monolith, and its internal balance of power should be the key to our strategy.  Japan, India, Vietnam and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome an American presence in the region.  Unless China is able to attract allies by successfully developing its “soft power,” the rise in its “hard” military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors, who will coalesce to balance its power.

A significant American military and economic presence helps to maintain the Asian balance of power and shape an environment that provides incentives for China to cooperate.  After the 2008-9 financial crisis, some Chinese mistakenly believed that America was in permanent decline and that this presented new opportunities.  A result was that China worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines — a misstep that confirmed that “only China can contain China.”

But America’s rebalancing toward Asia should not be aggressive.  We should heed Mr. Kennan’s warning against overmilitarization and ensure that China doesn’t feel encircled or endangered.  The world’s two largest economies have much to gain from cooperation on fighting climate change, pandemics, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation.

With China becoming more dependent on Middle Eastern energy, we should discuss maritime regulations to ensure free passage of ships and include China in Pacific naval exercises.  We should help China develop domestic energy resources like shale gas and encourage China and Japan to revive their 2008 plan for joint undersea gas exploitation.  And we should make clear that if China meets certain standards, it can join the negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed free-trade agreement around the Pacific Rim.

Containment is simply not a relevant policy tool for dealing with a rising China.  Power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants, and sometimes America’s power is greater when we act with others rather than merely over others.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and a former Pentagon official, is the author of the forthcoming book “Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era.”