羅老火箭與韓國太空戰略◎外交關係學會（2012.10）/雲程譯

【Comment】這一系列韓國羅老火箭的新聞、評論與翻譯，主要目的是在台灣媒體一個勁的誇張韓國近年經濟與科技成就時，提供一個冷靜的審思。沒有錯，韓國民族的拼勁令人動容，但卻有以商業手法發展工業與科技的抄捷徑隱憂。面子，有時是士氣，但一轉身也會是執拗。韓國擁有「國家」地位，能堂堂參與國際會議、組織與簽約，也是國家發展的助力。台灣人值得鼓勵，但民選政府卻是越來越像大清昏君，而且「貪念污染政策」的政權本質越來越清晰也逐漸擴大。外交關係學會不是一般的教授聯合會，其評論雖帶有官方色彩卻是字句針砭，請不要小覷。過兩天精神好再整理上週NHK　スペシャル「日の丸家電」節目的心得。

羅老火箭與韓國太空戰略◎外交關係學會（2012.10）/雲程譯韓國的造船、電子與汽車工業享有名氣，但仍在努力將衛星送上軌道。2012年10月26日的第三次發射已經延期。面對中印兩國以兩位數的航太經費增長與日本包含軍事目的的太空擴張，韓國要如何在此高科技領域競爭？韓國在1989年民主化與採行開放政策時，建立韓國航空宇宙研究院（KARI）。剛開始是引進並操作外國製衛星以累積本國實力達成最終通訊與遙感探測的能力。此階段韓國受惠於UK、US等國。韓國在1990年代起開始實質的衛星科技實驗。到1990年代晚期，其固體燃料火箭可以達到180公里高度，已經達到南韓在1970年代為了換取美國的地對地飛彈，而接受的飛彈射程限制的上限。華盛頓憂心韓國的軍事政府或將使用為攻擊性用途。為此，KARI改為專注通訊網路與遙感探測，並建立委由外國火箭發射的自主科學衛星。朝鮮擁有較為進步的彈道飛彈計劃，在1998年以「大埔洞一號」火箭發射衛星對韓國造成軍事威脅，也讓韓國科技成就沒面子。韓國無法在「飛彈科技管制體制」（MTCR）之外取得火箭技術，只得加入MTCR。
2001年韓國成為MTCR會員後，韓國尋求液態燃料火箭。由於成本與（非MTCR的）美國出口管制問題，韓國無法從美國取得技術，於是在2004年與俄羅斯達成協議取得液態燃料的Angara火箭，以作為其KSLV計劃的第一段火箭。韓國則以固態燃料引擎作為其第二段火箭。與俄羅斯的協議中，俄羅斯同意協助韓國KARI發展與建設位於全羅南道的太空發射設施，以利KARI太空人訓練，並載送太空人到國際太空站。怎知韓國首位太空人高山（Ko San）[1] 在俄羅斯的星城(Star City)，因盜取資料被俄羅斯當局禁止接受訓練，改為女性太空人李素妍於2008年4月升空到國際太空站。韓國因為花費鉅額2000萬美元並全賴俄羅斯科技才完成太空人的夢想，受到批評。KARI在發展衛星零件、大田市的太空管制與遙感中心等項目上有成功，希望在2015年擠身全球10大太空強權。但2008年的金融危機造成預算緊縮，火箭技術也難以克服。2009年，KARI首次發射羅老（KSLV）火箭失敗──第一段俄羅斯火箭成功，但韓國製的第二段火箭無法釋放衛星整流罩，出現失速、墜落、焚毀無法將衛星送到預定軌道。KARI在2010年6月再度發射，結果火箭在約兩分鐘後爆炸，俄韓兩國相互指摘。KARI在無計可施情況下，買下第三支Angara火箭。國發展太空科技起步較慢，遭遇了結構上的障礙。假使想要在亞洲國家佔有一席之地，韓國這種中型國家必須投資更多的預算，才有可能與已經領先數十年的亞洲先進國家競爭。日本在1970年1月就發射第一顆衛星，中國則是1970年4月，印度是1980年7月。反過來說，朝鮮因為金融困頓、低科技水準、聯合國制裁等原因，發展太空技術更加困難。平壤已經發射衛星失敗三次，既無操作衛星的經驗也無進步的衛星。韓國在與進步國之間的關係上比朝鮮有利，除美俄之外，KARI還與歐洲、烏克蘭、印度與日本有合作關係。朝鮮只與伊朗有合作。歷史上，發射失敗在發展太空初期極為正常。為了追趕成功發射衛星的蘇聯，美國從1957下半年到1958一整年遭遇許多技術障礙。KARI應該會克服羅老火箭。但韓國太空計劃的實景如何？近年來韓國的太空計劃經費日益縮減，現在約為2.62億美元（日本為38億美元，印度為13.4億美元）。假使想趕上亞洲鄰國，韓國還要投入更多資源。
KARI未來的計劃包括在2021年前發展國產、三段的液態燃料羅老二號火箭，使之能運送1.5公噸酬載到低軌道（羅老一號可運送0.1公噸。）韓國想接著日本、中國與印度之後在2023年前發射探月太空船。目前KARI基於成本因素已經放棄太空人計劃，當然也只能實現有限的目標。韓國的太空計劃目前著重發展國家太空活動技術自主，特別是在發射與衛星產品上。這些技術可用在國家安全任務，如太空偵測，當然也在建立未來提供商用太空服務的能力。在中期，韓國太空計劃花的錢會比賺的錢多。
KARI可以加強與友好國家和盟國的合作，以分攤的方式享有國際任務與衛星，而非自己去擁有或建立所有的技術。當美國重返亞洲時，KARI已經主動與盟邦分享軍事衛星成本，如此方能在面對中國崛起的太空威脅時，保護自身的太空資產。韓國可以加入日本、澳洲與歐洲太空中心成員國等美國與盟國的太空網路中扮演互利的角色，加強通訊、遙測、太空狀況偵查與全球定位等項目。印度也終將加入這些項目。當然，合作開發會比較「沒面子」，但會較為安全也較為實際。但是，要趕上盟國水準，要在競爭激烈的太空商業市場開發有限的產品時，南韓將面臨挑戰。成功發射羅老一號或許會使政府認為原計劃值得繼續堅持下去。太空活動的成本非常高，能對國家安全帶來重要的貢獻，也能「很有面子」。因此，韓國或許已經決定將逐漸增加太空投資。    revised on 20121101

【相關閱讀】
美同意釋韓800公里飛彈技術
從韓國的俄羅斯火箭看──以商業手法發展工業
韓國的俄羅斯火箭
韓國第三度火箭發射，又取消
朝鮮半島眼對牙
朝鮮試射飛彈：偷星不著，蝕把米
雙贏一輸：日本代射韓國衛星
南韓羅老號火箭發射暫停
7月30日韓國要發射太空火箭？
衛星發射基地建成 韓點燃「火箭強國」夢想　■朝鮮日報（2009.06.12）
俄向韓伸出橄欖枝：共建發射基地，
從羅老太空中心看韓國的希望、
Ivanova★space
南北拼飛彈，量質有辯證

The KSLV I Launch and South Korea’s Space Strategy◎Council on Foreign Relations（2012.10）
http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/kslv-launch-south-koreas-space-strategy/p29292

Current Issues in U.S.-ROK Relations

Overview

South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has successfully established its place in the international shipbuilding, electronics, and automobile industries.  Yet despite major investments in space technology, the ROK is still waiting for a breakthrough in its efforts to launch a satellite into orbit.  Its third attempt is currently scheduled to take place at the Naro Space Center on October 26, 2012.  In the midst of double-digit increases in Chinese and Indian space budgets and the expansion of Japan's space program to include military activities, what is South Korea's strategy for Asia's emerging space competition?  And how likely is it to accomplish its goals, given its late entry into this complex high-tech sector?

After years of technological underdevelopment, the ROK created the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) in 1989, just as it was undergoing democratization and opening up to the outside world.  Its initial strategy focused on using import substitution to establish a national capability for operating foreign-produced satellites, with the intention of eventually building its own communications and remote-sensing spacecraft.  During this time, KARI benefited from cooperation with Britain, the United States, and other foreign satellite manufacturers.

In conjunction with its satellite program, KARI also began experiments in sounding-rocket technology in the 1990s.  By the late 1990s, however, these solid-fuel boosters had reached altitudes of nearly 180 kilometers, bumping into U.S.-imposed missile-range restrictions South Korea had agreed to in return for surface-to-surface missile technology in the 1970s.  Washington feared that the ROK's military government might be tempted to use missiles for offensive purposes.  As a result, KARI concentrated on building a network of communications and remote-sensing satellites using foreign technologies, while beginning to construct its own scientific satellites, which it launched on foreign boosters.

However, the advance of North Korea's ballistic missile program and its attempted launch of a satellite from its Taepodong I missile in 1998 posed a clear military threat to South Korea.  In the context of the North-South political rivalry, Pyongyang's space launch gambit also risked endangering Seoul's technological reputation.  Frustrated by attempts to acquire booster technology outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), South Korea took steps to become a member.

After entering the MTCR in 2001, Seoul sought to acquire liquid-fuel boosters for use in a devoted space-launch program.  After failing to reach a deal with U.S. providers (due to high cost and non-MTCR-related U.S. export controls), KARI ended up entering an agreement with Russia in 2004 for the purchase of a large liquid-fuel Angara booster to serve as the first stage of its planned Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV) I.  KARI would construct the solid-fuel second-stage booster and the satellite.

As part of the space agreement, Russia agreed to assist in the development and construction of a space-launch facility on an island in South Jeolla province and to provide KARI with astronaut training and a flight to the International Space Station.  After a mini-scandal involving the unauthorized removal of training manuals from Russia's Star City by the ROK's first-choice astronaut Ko San, the Russian Space Agency barred him from its program.  This turn of events allowed his female alternate, Yi So-yeon, to claim the title of the first Korean citizen to venture into space.  She traveled to the space station in April 2008, becoming a national hero, although critics derided the flight for its $20 million price tag and reliance on Russian technology.

KARI's success in satellite component development and the construction of a state-of-the-art space control and remote-sensing center in Taejon provided evidence of South Korean progress toward its goal of becoming one of the world's top ten space powers by 2015.  However, budgetary troubles beginning in 2008 and difficulties in mastering the complexities of satellite launch have recently plagued KARI.  In 2009, KARI's first attempt to launch the KSLV I ended in disappointment, after a successful Russian first stage was followed by the failed release of the satellite shroud from the Korean-built second stage, causing the still-attached spacecraft to lose velocity, tumble, and burn up in the atmosphere.  KARI's second launch attempt in June 2010 ended in an explosion about two minutes into the KSLV I's flight, causing finger pointing by both Russia and South Korea.  Lacking other options, KARI eventually purchased another Angara booster for its third KSLV I attempt.

South Korea is struggling in space against structural obstacles having to do with its late entry into space technology and exploration.  Put simply, as a middle-sized power, Seoul has to invest a higher percent of its resources into space activity if it hopes to develop a sustainable niche position among Asia's larger and more established space powers, which are decades ahead of it.  Japan achieved its first satellite launch in January 1970, China in April 1970, and India in July 1980.

However, Seoul's peninsular rival North Korea faces even greater obstacles in its space efforts because of its sharply limited finances, much lower technological base, and UN sanctions on its technology-acquisition program.  Pyongyang has failed in three attempts to orbit a satellite thus far and has no experience in operating satellites or with advanced satellite production.  Another advantage Seoul enjoys compared to Pyongyang is its good relations with more developed space powers.  Besides its space ties to Russia and the United States, KARI cooperates with members of the European Space Agency, Ukraine, India, and Japan.  North Korea's sole contacts in space activity may be with Iran.

Historically speaking, early failures in space-launch programs are part of the normal growing pains of such efforts.  The United States suffered many problems in the latter half of 1957 and throughout 1958 as it struggled to catch up with the Soviet Union after the successful launch of Sputnik.  KARI is likely to overcome its problems with the KSLV I. However, what can it realistically expect of its space program?  With a budget that has declined in recent years and now sits at $262 million (compared to Japan's $3.8 billion and India's $1.34 billion), South Korea will need to devote considerably more resources to space activities if it hopes to catch up with its Asian neighbors.

KARI's future plans include the development of a domestically produced, three-stage, liquid-fuel KSLV II booster by 2021 capable of launching payloads of up to 1.5 tons into low-Earth orbit (compared to the 100 kilograms of the KSLV I).  The ROK aims to launch its first lunar probe by 2023, a feat already accomplished by Japan, China, and India in the past decade.  Notably, KARI has abandoned efforts to maintain its astronaut program due to its high cost, suggesting a possible recognition of more limited aims.

The ROK's space program is now focused on developing national technological independence in space activity, particularly for space launch and satellite production.  These technologies are important for national security missions, such as space-based reconnaissance, but they are also necessary building blocks for providing commercial space services in the future.  Thus, in the medium term, South Korea's space program will be more of an "investment" than a moneymaker.

Fortunately, KARI can expand its reach into space by building more intensive cooperative links with its friends and allies, thus allowing it to cost-share in international missions and satellite constellations without having to own or construct all of the technology.  As the United States pivots toward Asia, it has begun to reach out more actively to its allies to share military satellite costs and reduce vulnerabilities to its own space assets posed by China's emerging capabilities.

The ROK could play a mutually beneficial role as part of a growing network of U.S.-allied space capabilities, joining Japan, Australia, and members of the European Space Agency in increasingly linked networks for communications, remote sensing, space situational awareness, and global positioning.  India may eventually join these nations as well.  While such an approach may be less glamorous than a go-it-alone strategy, it is also safer and more affordable for Seoul.

Nevertheless, Seoul will face challenges in bringing itself up to the level of allied actors and in developing even a limited range of commercial products that will be viable in a competitive space marketplace.  A successful flight of the KSLV I may convince the government that it should push ahead.

There are high entry costs to space activity, but it will provide important contributions to national security and offer benefits that come with the associated prestige.  In this regard, the ROK government may have already decided that increased investment in space capability is unavoidable.

[1]  http://bell.dtmonline.com/epaperdetail.asp?eno=43154632263  and
在2008年3月10日，南韓教育科學技術部宣佈因為高山在俄羅斯的訓練設施內多次未經允許擅自將操作手冊帶出訓練基地，違反了俄韓間的訓練協議，因此將他更換。在俄羅斯載人航太史上，因違規被取消太空飛行資格尚屬首次。所以，高山的違規真相，成為俄羅斯媒體挖掘的重點，在媒體的「窮追猛打」之下，高山違規事件的詳情逐漸浮出水面。據培訓中心一名不願透露姓名的領導人向俄《消息報》披露，高山是作為宇航研究員到星城接受培訓的，但他本人在訓練過程中一直熱衷於了解一些與他本人的訓練計劃無關的材料，因此早在事發之前他就已經被同事們戲稱為「間諜」。

2007年9月，高山將訓練手冊混在個人物品裏，打包寄回國內。對此，培訓中心向高山提出了嚴重警告。然而，讓俄方忍無可忍的是，今年2月，高山設法弄到了與訓練計劃毫不相干的聯盟號宇宙飛船駕駛手冊，並拿到訓練中心外進行複製，結果被安全人員當場抓住。「高山此舉並非出於好奇，他在保密協議上簽過字，知道什麼可以，什麼不可以」。高山私自複製飛船駕駛手冊的行為，引起培訓中心領導人的強烈不滿。
3月7日，培訓中心就高山的所作所為向南韓教育科技部發出通報，並要求韓方撤換高山。據俄羅斯《報紙報》報導，培訓中心曾建議航太署將高山驅逐出境，但考慮到此舉對兩國關係可能造成的影響，航太署並沒有採納培訓中心的建議。而高山將繼續留在加加林培訓中心，協助李素妍升空。

http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%AB%98%E5%B1%B1_(%E5%AE%87%E8%88%AA%E5%93%A1)    accessed on 20121031