加拿大對外關係文件：韓國衝突第一部份建立聯合國統一指揮體系-2　■雲程譯

逸峰兄找到這文件，做了功課：韓戰與台海命運：看1950 一場北大西洋公約外長密會的解密文件！

他建立功勞，我就做苦勞。有功有苦，才會紮實。

 

加拿大對外關係文件

第16冊-12

第二章　韓國衝突第一部份

建立聯合國統一指揮體系

12.

DEA/50069-A-40

美國大使給外交部長給首相

電報雲程WA 1412

緊急雲程機密

1950年6月27日於華盛頓

韓國雲程

1. 北大西洋公約國家的大使們在今天早上1130於國務院集會時，柏金斯（George Perkins）擔任主席，由肯楠（George 雲程Kennan）協助。

2. 柏金斯說明此次會議不應視為北大西洋理事會（the North Atlantic Council）的緊急會議。大家決定邀請北約國家的大使，作為對美國友好國家的代表，以便其得以在總統就北韓向南韓進攻而決定採取回復情勢的行動後接獲通知。

3. 柏金斯在今天中午1200唸出總統發出的聲明，我將立即電傳其全文。你將察覺到根據聯合王國政府的期望，有關共產黨進攻的煽動語句已被改寫，略去了蘇聯的責任這一部份。Franks簡略的說了此點，強調在其政府的觀點中，當面臨他所謂「發出美國的力量與決心」時，給俄羅斯人一個開溜的機會是很重要的。

4. 程序中有趣的部分是由肯楠所做，對總統命令美國空軍與海軍掩護與支援韓國政府部隊、命令第七艦隊採取行動以避免福爾摩沙遭受攻擊，以及進一步支援菲律賓並增加支援印度支那法國部隊的背景考量說明。

5. 最重要的，肯楠分析國務院對共產黨發動攻擊的動機的評論。其動機是混合多種考量的，他特別強調三個因素：雲程

 (a) 他們認為時機已經來臨，北韓武裝與訓練部隊已經完成可對南韓成功達成任務的階段。

 (b) 對蘇聯政府而言，已體認到俄羅斯對於「對日和約」已無可置喙，至少在軍事範圍內與增強其在遠東的戰略地位。雲程

 (c) 無證據顯示蘇聯政府設想到：此朝鮮的行動會發展到普遍性戰爭，或認知到介入一個巨大的危機中。Kerman說，美國的專家已經考慮過此時蘇聯政府只願意介入一個有限度的危機，從而當南韓開始攻擊時以譴責來開溜的意見。

6. 再說到美國有關韓國情勢政策的動機，肯楠說最初總統的決定並未考慮到朝鮮的戰略重要性。幕僚給總統卓越的諮詢是攻擊要如何實施，以及給予共產黨「嚴重的象徵性」時機，不僅對遠東地區而言，而是對世界其他地區。若美國政府和自由世界其他地區的反應顯得猶疑不決與缺乏力量，反彈是會非常劇烈的。

7. 在發展對特定區域的概念時，Kerman說僅僅對日本而言結果是會發常嚴重的。美國專家全體一致的意見是美國佔領軍示弱的話，將會產生非常嚴重的後果。雲程

8. 福爾摩沙是共產黨下一個目標，而其位置毫無疑問的會受韓國事件後果的劇烈影響。美國很謹慎的表達其對於福爾摩沙政治上的中立。目前要採取的行動只是避免受到武裝攻擊。必要的推論是，中國政府（雲雲程譯註：此處指ROC）已被要求停止對大陸的海空行動。Kerman說國務院預計取得蔣介石的協議並無困難，因他可爭取獲得保衛福爾摩沙。肯楠繼續說美國政府絕不先決定此行動對福爾摩沙的處置。他認為福爾摩沙最終的處置，將由聯合國依據太平洋地區的整體安全利益以及考量中國人民的利益而決定。目前的行動，只是短期行動，受眼前太平洋和平與安全的條件影響。雲程肯楠說，菲律賓也一樣直接深受福爾摩沙情勢的影響。當地政府深受共產黨搧動的壓力，所以必須以更直接與更進一步的軍事協助強化菲律賓。

9. 最後，從更廣的角度看目前美國針對朝鮮的行動，肯楠說，完全體會目前所決定的行動有個基本的危機，但比起不採取行動的風險將更大。掩護與支持韓國部隊並非與蘇聯敵對。目前共產黨的軍事行動，是測試著美國以實力達成和平的政策。肯楠強調一個可能的隱藏影響，即韓國的事件可能特別與德國有關連。若共產黨在朝鮮與太平洋其他較弱地區的作為得逞的話，他認為類似的行動將在德國重現。大使們並未不同意肯楠的這意見，並大體同意與感謝肯楠對於總統作朝鮮事件決策之考量背景所作的陳述。雲程

 

Documents on Canadian External Relations

Volume #16 - 12.

CHAPTER II　KOREAN CONFLICT PART 1
CREATION OF UNITED NATIONS' UNIFIED COMMAND

12. 雲程

DEA/50069-A-40

Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM WA 1412

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Washington, June 27th, 1950

KOREA

1. George Perkins was in the Chair, assisted by George Kennan, when the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty countries assembled at the State Department at 11:30 this morning. All the North Atlantic Treaty countries were represented except Luxembourg .

2. George Perkins explained that this meeting was not to be regarded as an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It had been decided to invite the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty countries as representatives of countries friendly to the United States in order that they might be informed of action which the President had decided to take to restore the situation arising from the invasion of South Korea by forces from North Korea .

3. Perkins read out the statement which the President issued at twelve noon today, the text of which I am sending in my immediately following teletype. You will observe that the reference to Communist instigation of the attack has been reworded to omit reference to direct Soviet responsibility, to accord with the wishes expressed by the United Kingdom Government. Franks spoke briefly on this point, emphasizing that in the view of his Government it was essential to give the Russians an opportunity to beat a retreat when confronted by what he described as "the welcome manifestation of American power and determination".

4. The interesting part of the proceedings was an explanation furnished by George Kennan of the background of the considerations which led to the President's decision to order United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support, and to order the Seventh Fleet to take action to prevent attack on Formosa, as well as to give further support to the Philippines and to accelerate assistance to the forces of France in Indo China.

5. First of all, Kennan gave an analysis of the State Department's appreciation of the motives of the Communists who had been responsible for launching the attack. While stressing that this motivation was based on a mixture of considerations, he cited three factors in particular:

(a) That they thought that the time had arrived at which the arming and training of the forces of North Korea had reached a stage of completion to permit successful operations against South Korea ;

(b) A realization on the part of the Soviet Government that Russia would have nothing to do with the Japanese Peace Treaty, at least in so far as its military aspects were concerned, and a desire to strengthen their strategic position in the Far East;

(c) That there was no evidence that the Soviet Government had envisaged :.t this time the action in Korea as developing into general war, or were conscious that it involved great risks. Kerman said that the United States experts had come to the considered opinion that the Soviet Government at this time was only willing to engage itself in a limited risk and had therefore provided itself a way out by the charge that the South Koreans had initiated the attack.

6. Turning next to the motivations of the United States policy in respect to the Korean situation, Kerman said that, in the first place, the President's decision was not dictated by any overpowering consideration of the strategic importance of Korea itself. The outstanding fact confronting the advisers to the President was the way the attack had been carried out, and that its timing was intended to give this Communist action a "tremendous symbolic significance", not only in the Far East but in the rest of the world. If the reaction of the United States Government and the rest of the free world showed a lack of determination and strength, the repercussions would be very serious.

7. Developing this concept in relation to specific territories, Kerman said that in Japan alone the results would be very serious. It was the view of all United States experts that any show of weakness on the part of United States occupation forces would have very grave consequences indeed.

8. Formosa was in all probability next on the Communist timetable, and the position there undoubtedly would be affected drastically by the outcome of events in Korea . The United States had been careful to show no inclination to intervene politically in Formosa . The action now to be taken was intended only to prevent armed attack on the Island . As a necessary corollary the Chinese Government was being called upon to cease air and naval operations against the mainland. Kerman said that the State Department expected no difficulties in getting Chiang's agreement, as he would have the best of the bargain in obtaining protection for Formosa . Kennan went on to say that there was absolutely no intention on the part of the United States Government to pre determine the disposition of Formosa by this action. The ultimate disposition of Formosa he thought might be determined by the United Nations in accordance with the general security interests of the Pacific area and taking into account the interests of the Chinese people. The present action was only short tern action and dictated by the immediate requirements of the peace and security of the Pacific. The Philippines , Kennan said, were likewise most directly affected by developments in the security situation in Formosa . The Government there was already pressed on account of Communist agitation, and it was therefore essential to strengthen the Philippines by more direct and accelerated military assistance.

9. Finally, turning to the broader justification of United States action in respect of Korea at this time, Kerman said that it was fully realized that there was an element of risk involved in taking the action now decided, but that the risk of not taking action would be greater. The cover and support for South Korean forces did not constitute an act of hostility against the Soviet Union . The military action now represented a real test by the Communists of the United States policy of peace through strength. Kennan underlined the possible implications which the events in Korea might have, particularly in regard to Germany . If the Communist efforts in Korea and other weak spots in the Pacific were successful, he had no doubt that a similar test of strength would follow in Germany . There was no disposition on the part of the Ambassadors to disagree with this view and several of them expressed general agreement with, and appreciation for, Kennan's review of the background of the considerations which had led to the President's decision on Korea .

 

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