加拿大對外關係文件：韓國衝突第一部份建立聯合國統一指揮體系-1　■雲程譯

逸峰兄找到這文件，做了功課：韓戰與台海命運：看1950 一場北大西洋公約外長密會的解密文件！

他建立功勞，我就做苦勞。有功有苦，才會紮實。

 

加拿大對外關係文件

第16冊-11

第二章　韓國衝突第一部份

建立聯合國統一指揮體系-1

11.

PCO/Vo1.-167

雲程

摘自外交部長給首相之備忘錄

最高雲程機密

1950年6月24日雲程於渥太華

 

韓國雲程

美國大使今早0930打電話給我。Heeney先生在場。他給我一份電報，這是他的政府所發出，有關韓戰的聲明全文。在其中，美國總統提議在今天中午1200發表。他告訴我他將盡快發送一份副本。當時我對此沒有評論，我想要這份副本來研讀以便做個觀察。

在1045時，Wrong先生從華盛頓打電話說國務院已經問過他，與其他北約國家的大使群集討論前述的聲明全文。很顯然的，這份聲明已經在電話中唸給他聽了。Olive Franks爵士已經向美國表達，其政府對於總統聲明內容的憂心。我告訴Wrong先生，我手頭上沒有這份聲明的副本，但稍早有唸給我聽，我體會這份憂心，而我說我正在等美國大使館給副本，我收到後會給Wrong先生打電話。

幾分鐘後，我收到全文副本受，我再度聯繫Wrong先生，並指出我有關聲明全文在形式與實質上的疑慮。我想，在美國空軍與海軍實施了掩護與支持大韓民國軍隊時，即事實上介入了干涉戰爭，使用「共產帝國主義」一詞並無必要。此時，我並不那樣關心此即將實施的干涉是否明智？當然，若美國要這樣干涉，就要在安理會討論與透過決議案採取適當手段，以使得干涉限定在〈憲章〉的架構內，然後進行。因為安理會已在今天下午召開，有關美國實行此案並未延宕。總統所提議的是行動，這表示美國介入干涉，但並非集體決議下的集體行動。這將表示美國將採取行動，且將其帶其他國家隨後進行支持與制裁。我感覺到這樣做是不對的，即便如此，我體認到時間因素非常重要。我也懷疑是否總統使用前述有關空中支援的字眼，是理解他所說這字眼所引含的意義。雲程

我也問了Wrong先生，有關福爾摩沙的字眼。事實上，其提議表示福爾摩沙應成為美國被保護領（a U.S. protectorate），即使如此，美國將持續承認蔣介石佔領政權為中國政府（the U.S. would continue to recognize the Chiang KaiShek occupation regime as the Government of China）。雲程考慮到總統聲明全文，命令福爾摩沙的中國政府停止所有對中國大陸的海空行動，並加上第七艦隊將保證此命令之執行，這是非常不尋常的。

我向Wrong先生強調，當我個人對總統聲明文的不滿時，然而，這仍是美國政府的責任。無論如何，若其他國家受邀，即使此是他所即將參加的會議，則我們必然有權向美國政府提出此項疑慮。

稍後，Wrong先生打電話說，將我觀察的要義以及其觀點，轉給肯楠（George Kennan）。肯楠說服他們，而認為聲明文應被修改，且到今天稍晚才會發表。雲程

我和你在1130就此問題會面，且同意和Drew先生就前述概略事項進行初步與非正式談話。我告訴Drew先生，在我們再度收到Wrong先生的回音後，你可能想諮詢他與其他領袖。Drew先生對我的訊息以及初步觀察表示滿意，並說假如情況許可，他將很高興在今天下午與你進一步討論此問題。

 

 

Documents on Canadian External Relations

Volume #16 - 11.

CHAPTER II KOREAN CONFLICT PART 1
CREATION OF UNITED NATIONS' UNIFIED COMMAND

11.

PCO/Vo1.-167

Extract from Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, June 24th, 1950

KOREA

The United States Ambassador¹ called to see me this morning at 9.30. Mr. Heeney was present. He showed me a telegram which he had received from his government with the text of a statement on the Korean war, which the President proposed to issue this morning at 12.00 noon.² He told me that he would be sending a copy of this text shortly. I made no comment on it at the time as I wished to have a copy of the text for examination before making any observations.

At 10.45 Mr. Wrong telephoned from Washington to say that he had been asked by the State Department to meet with the other Ambassadors of the North Atlantic countries to discuss the above text, which apparently had been read to him over the telephone. Sir Oliver Franks had already expressed to the Americans the anxiety of his government over the contents of the President's statement. I told Mr. Wrong that I did not have a copy of the text before me, but that having read it earlier, I shared this anxiety, and I added that I was awaiting a copy from the U.S. Embassy, and that I would phone him, Mr. Wrong, when I received it.

A few minutes later, with the text before me, I talked with Mr. Wrong again and pointed out to him my doubts about both the form and substance of the text. I thought that the reference to "Communist imperialism" was unnecessary, while the statement that the U.S. Air and Sea Forces would give cover and support to the forces of the Republic of Korea would, in fact, involve, if carried out, intervention in this war. At the moment I was not so much concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom of such intervention as about the way in which it might be brought about. Surely if the United States wished to intervene in this way, it should be done after the matter had been discussed at the Security Council and appropriate action had been taken there through a resolution, which would bring such intervention within the terms of the Charter. As the Security Council was meeting this very afternoon, no delay would be involved in the United States bringing the matter before it. What the President was proposing was action which might mean U.S. intervention, but which would not be collective action as a result of any collective decision. This would mean that the U.S. would take the action and would expect other countries later to support and sanction it. I felt that this was the wrong way to proceed, even though I realized that the time element was so important. I wondered also whether the President in the use of the above words regarding air support realized the full implications of what he was saying.

I also questioned with Mr. Wrong the wording of the paragraph which dealt with Formosa . What, in fact, was proposed was that Formosa should become a U.S. protectorate, even though the U.S. would continue to recognize the Chiang KaiShek occupation regime as the Government of China. This seemed all the more anomalous, in view of the fact that the text of the President's statement ordered the Chinese Government in Formosa to cease all sea and air operations against the Chinese mainland, adding that the Seventh Fleet would see that this order was carried out.

I emphasized to Mr. Wrong that while I personally was unhappy about this statement of the President, nevertheless, it was the responsibility of the U.S. Government. However, if other countries were being invited to associate themselves with it, even through such a meeting as the one which he was about to attend, then we certainly had the right to bring our doubts to the notice of the U.S. Government.

Later, Mr. Wrong phoned to say that he had passed on the substance of my observations, which were in accordance with his own views, to George Kennan, who was impressed by them and thought that the text should be modified accordingly, and possibly not issued until later in the day.

I saw you about this matter at 11.30 and as agreed had a preliminary and informal word with Mr. Drew³ about the developments outlined above. I told Mr. Drew that after we had heard from Mr. Wrong again you might wish to consult with him and the other Leaders. Mr. Drew expressed satisfaction at my message and my preliminary observations, and said that he would be glad to discuss the matter further with you in the afternoon, if developments made that desirable.⁴

¹Stanley Woodward.

²Pour la version finale de la declaration du president, voir :/For the final version of the President's
statement, see:/ U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950 1955, Basic Documents,
Volume 2, Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 2539 2540.

³Gorge Drew, député progressiste conservateur de Carleton et chef de l'Opposition.
George Drew, Progressive Conservative M.P. (Carleton) and Leader of the Opposition.

⁴La deuxième moitié de cette note est imprimée sous le titre de document 31.
The second half of this memorandum is printed as Document 31.

 

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