老師都說市場上散戶一定會輸給專業經理,那華爾街的避險基金是怎麼被GameStop的散戶給扳倒的呢?本集邀請蕭子昂,Stan哥來聊聊GameStop與風險控管!
蕭子昂 (Stan Siao) 個人簡歷: 退休前: • 永豐證券投資信託公司 董事長 2015-2018 • 美國遠東國民銀行 董事長 2010-2017 • 永豐金控 總經理 2010-2015 • 中華開發金控 資深副總經理 2004-2008 • 大華證券 董事長 2004-2008 • 香港摩根史坦利 (Morgan Stanley HK) Managing Director 董事總經理 1997-2004 • 美國信孚銀行 (Bankers Trust Taipei and HK) 副總經理 1994-1997 • 美國美林證券 (Merrill Lynch HK) 1993-1994 • 美國摩根大通銀行 (Chase Manhattan Bank NY & HK) 1990-1993 退休後: 燃點公民平台
https://www.sparktaiwan.org/ 華爾街的投資銀行從80年代開始,金融產品的交易從純粹為客戶服務慢慢成為摻入投資銀行自己的資金投資。之後產品與手段開始有了重大的改變,其中如投資銀行Salomon Brothers的故事,大家可以參考Liar’s Poker一書(
https://cutt.ly/Mxf0XmX)。從一個宏觀的角度來看,利率從80年代開始的10%多,到少於2%的今天,大部分投資人的目標還是在追求高回報率。只是,努力的過程裡也許很多投資人會忘記高回報率同時代表著高風險。 說穿了,華爾街的投資銀行專業經理與散戶的最大差別便在於風險控管(風控)。除了管理交易員與投資部位,投資銀行主管負責的風控手段裡,常會看到主管買與既有投資相反的部位。風險控管不只是每天、全球、甚至董事會等級的管理,必要時如美國的911事件,華爾街的投資銀行會以不計成本的模式,全球性與即時性地控制既有投資部位的風險(翻譯:花粉~多錢去沖銷既有的投資,避免掉入造成破產的無底洞)。 GameStop之所以會讓人跌破眼鏡是因為華爾街的專業風控被散戶攻破。不否認的,華爾街的避險基金有一些是抱持牛仔心態,願意承擔較大風險。因此,有一些專業投資人的風控只看自己的部位而沒有抓這支股票對市場上整體的動向,於是當賣壓出現時才發現出不了場,無法停損。可是從一個華爾街行內行人的角度來看,最驚訝的是現在年輕投資人的邏輯不只限於賺錢,同時還追求社會的認同與爽感。雖然說華爾街接下來的風險控管勢必會把這一環也算進去,但遊戲規則的改變對未來的影響只能說對於現在還是個未知數。 Until the 1970s, trading in financial instruments was primarily a service offered to clients of investment banks. As the financial markets continue to develop, proprietary desks (trading the bank’s own account) gains prominence. The infamous ones that people still remember today are Salomon Brothers and Drexel Burnham Lambert. (Liar’s Poker is a must-read in this regard:
https://cutt.ly/Mxf0XmX). In a secular context, this is a story of chasing the vanishing interest rates. As it dropped from the mid-teens in the 1980s to less than 2% today, investors primarily seek higher yields. What many investors do not seem to intuit in this process, however, is that high yield, given low interest rates, must imply higher risks. Trading in an institutional setting is different from what a retail investor does in one key respect - risk management. Personal vim is not encouraged, despite what Hollywood may say. In addition to managing traders and a good nose on the directions of the markets, risk management is a daily, global, and board level activity in investment banks. At its most common, managers may hedge by betting against his own traders’ positions. At its extreme, when events that nobody could have foreseen, such as the 9-11 attack in the US, happen, hedging against a bank’s own positions takes on a global proportion with a whatever-it-takes mandate. Given the level of resources and sophistication of institutional investors, what happened to GameStop (see news article:
https://cutt.ly/xxf4dIJ) where the high flying hedge funds were brought down by retail investors? Clearly, some funds were acting like callous cowboys. It is also clear that some risk managers only considered their own positions and did not take into account the possibility of a short squeeze. What is most interesting, and uncertain, is whether the GameStop episode foreshadows a new era of social investing by young investors where social approval plays an equal part from the good old fashion profit motives. If true, this will change the rules of the game for investing in ways we have yet to fully understand.