Too Big to Quail（龐大到無所畏懼）◎Orville Schell / Time Magazine（2013.04.01） translated by SW
【Comment】
2013年4月1日出版的Time雜誌，底頁有一篇關於習近平的報導Too Big to Quail。標題Too Big to Quail一語雙關，非常有趣。
國家強大，所以無懼？還是狀況或危機太龐大了，中國人看不到全貌，所以不知道害怕？
為了生存，習近平謹慎的不露出其政治傾向，中國人民不知（習近平又不是人民選出來的），外國更不知。
習近平被觀察到不斷公開支持解放軍的事實，也令外界不安。朝鮮緊張一旦蔓延，或會是個驗證。
Time的觀點可能在警告中國要正視國內問題，不要把中國夢搞得太大。
Too Big to Quail（龐大到無所畏懼）◎Orville Schell / Time Magazine（2013.04.01） translated by SW
全世界最隱晦的其中兩個國家，最近有新領袖就職：梵諦岡的教宗方濟，以及中國的國家主席習近平。教宗方濟是個出人意表的人選，但習近平的繼位早已預定：習近平早在去年十二月，就被提名為位高權重的中國共產黨總書記以及中央軍委會主席。這兩位新領袖都同樣面對日益高漲的相同呼籲，即透明與公正的治理。雖然佔據較多媒體版面的是教宗，但是習近平身為世界最大國的領袖，對國際事務的潛在影響要比教宗大太多了。
曾經，中國的領導者像教宗一樣被賦予神性。我曾於1975年步行經過紫禁城與中南海，那時毛澤東仍在世，文化大革命正如火如荼地進行。「大內」隱藏在厚厚的紅磚牆內，與俗世隔絕。毛澤東的光環，如歷代天子（或者如天父）帶著神秘與權力，向外閃耀光芒。就像天子與天父，毛澤東營造了虛誇的形象，強化他身為最高統治者的權威。
但是時代變了。二十年驚人的經濟成長，有活力與堅持的中產階級，都使得中國人不想再見到自我吹噓的「偉大領導人」文化，即毛澤東，以及一手主導開放的鄧小平。今天，經營中國的是大多由技術官僚所組成的領導團隊，由政治局常委（目前有七人）領導，國家主席只是在平起平坐的常委中排名第一罷了。習近平與其同夥並不是靠自我推銷或公開宣傳政治觀點而爬上高位的，他們靠的是掩藏鋒芒，在黨的權力迷宮中靜悄悄地謀權。
所以外界對於習近平的才幹幾乎一無所知。多年來，小心謹慎才是治國之道。讓一切維持運轉，逐漸將步伐拉大而不是突然跨出大步，尤其是經濟方面。結果是：不再有過去那種極端的、破壞性的行為(尤其是毛澤東時代)，但是，也不再有大膽的創建。維穩是首要目標。
然而，與羅馬天主教會一樣，中國也面臨轉變。它的經濟過度依賴國家投資與出口；官員貪腐規模龐大；貧富之間擴大差距；環境破壞相當驚人；嚴厲的統治招來更多人民的躁動。
習近平似乎明白中國需要改變。他公開譴責貪汙與不公，抨擊官員過度驕奢，來勢洶洶地警告說，這種行為將造成「人民的憤怒、社會的不安、與政權的變動」。他說他要國家「復興」。雖如此，習近平仍然是個謎。他在2012二月訪美期間，沒讓外界捉摸到任何政治取向。他相當和藹可親，但是，他的頭髮完美工整，他的表情冷漠宛若蒙娜麗莎，他總事先備妥演講稿。他以此成功地掩飾了所可能具備的任何魅力。要記得：中國不是民主國家，習近平的選民不是人民，而是他的黨內同儕。
還要注意人民解放軍，習近平不斷地公開支持。北京認為，與日本以及東南亞各國的島嶼爭議是國土侵佔，而美國的「亞洲樞軸」是圍堵。從最後一個皇帝到現在的每個中國領導者，都拿外人對中國的「百年欺凌」來塑造受害者的形象。萬一習近平以民族意識點燃這個國家，北京與其鄰國及華盛頓的關係可能將遭到破壞。
習近平說他有個「中國夢」，要恢復中國偉大的國際地位。為了實現此夢想，他切不可編撰一部海外冒險奇遇記，而是應該寫好下一幕國內改革發展的戲碼。這樣才配稱為真正受敬重之中國的偉大領袖。
Xi says he has a "China dream" to restore his nation to a place of greatness in the world. To achieve that dream, he must write not a saga of adventurism overseas but the next reformist act of his country's development drama at home. Only then will he be a worthy "big leader" for a truly respected China .
Too Big to Quail
By Orville Schell Monday, Apr. 01, 2013
In two of the world's most opaque states, new leaders have just taken office: Pope Francis in the Vatican and President Xi Jinping in China. While the Pope was a surprise choice, Xi's ascension was expected: he had already been named last November to the powerful positions of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the country's Central Military Commission. Both men face mounting calls to govern more transparently and justly. The Pope has generated more news coverage, but it is Xi, as head of the planet's biggest nation, who has far greater potential to influence world affairs.
Once, the leaders of China were imbued with almost as much divinity as a Pope. I first walked down the Avenue of Eternal Peace past the Forbidden City and Zhongnanhai, the party preserve in Beijing, in 1975, when Mao Zedong still lived and his Cultural Revolution still raged. Hidden away from the mortal world behind thick vermillion walls around the "great within," as this imperial enclave was once known, Mao's aura radiated outward with as much mystery and power as any enthroned Son of Heaven — or Holy Father. Like both, Mao cultivated a larger-than-life persona to enhance his authority as a supreme ruler.
No longer. After two decades of stunning economic growth and the advent of a vibrant and willful middle class, most Chinese are glad to be done with the ego-fueled "big leader" culture of Mao, and his successor, Deng Xiaoping, who orchestrated China's opening to the world. Today, China is run by a collective leadership of mostly technocrats, led by the Politburo's Standing Committee — currently comprising seven members — in which the President is merely first among equals. Xi and his cohorts rose not by self-promotion or public projection of their political views but by keeping their heads down and quietly maneuvering the party's labyrinth of power.
That's why the outside world knows so little about what makes Xi tick. For years now, the ruling strategy has been caution. Keep things moving along, especially the economy, by taking incremental steps rather than giant leaps. Result: none of the extreme, destructive actions that hurt China in the past, particularly under Mao, but also hardly any bold initiatives. Stability is the paramount objective.
Yet, not unlike the Roman Catholic Church, China is at an inflection point. Its economy is too dependent on state investment and exports; official corruption is epic in scale; the gap between rich and poor is widening; environmental problems are horrendous; and ever more Chinese chafe under the sternness of the rulers.
Xi seems to realize China needs change. He has spoken out against corruption and injustice, and attacked the excesses of officials, warning darkly that such behavior leads to "popular anger, social unrest and regime change." He says he wants national "rejuvenation." Nonetheless, Xi remains an enigma. During his February 2012 visit to the U.S., it was hard to gain any real political sense of the man. He seemed affable enough, but, with his hair always perfectly lacquered in place, his implacable, almost Mona Lisa — like countenance, and his set speeches, he succeeded in masking whatever charisma he possesses. Remember: China is not a democracy — Xi's primary constituency is not the people but his party peers.
Then there's the People's Liberation Army, for which Xi has repeatedly expressed public support. Beijing sees its island disputes with Japan and sundry Southeast Asian nations as territorial encroachment, and the U.S.'s "pivot to Asia" as containment. The "100 years of humiliation" that China suffered under foreigners has provided a narrative of victimization for every Chinese leader since the last Emperor. Should Xi fire up the country with nationalist sentiment, Beijing's relations with its neighbors and with Washington could be in jeopardy.
Xi says he has a "China dream" to restore his nation to a place of greatness in the world. To achieve that dream, he must write not a saga of adventurism overseas but the next reformist act of his country's development drama at home. Only then will he be a worthy "big leader" for a truly respected China.
Schell, director of the Asia Society's Center on U.S.-China Relations, is co-author, with John Delury, of the forthcoming Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century
