學者呼籲美國介入台海

 

【Comment】
While Dr. Michael Swaine concluded "China's military buildup, its increasing economic and political leverage, and its growing nationalism suggest that a serious future crisis over arms sales will likely occur before any significant movement toward a stable modus vivendi between Beijing and Taipei emerges," MYJ has confidence to acquire a political agreement with Beijing in a decade.
Where does Ma's confidence come from?
「中台之間的緊張關係取得重大緩解在很長時間內都不太可能。」
令人懷疑：馬簽定和平協議的信心哪裡來？

 

美學者建議美國放棄“不插手”台海事務政策◎VOA（2011.10.17）

美國一位知名學者最近發表文章建議美國政府放棄“不插手”中國和台灣關係的做法，直接與中國大陸對話，並與台灣磋商。
美國卡內基國際和平基金會的高級研究員史文(Michael Swaine[1])最近在美國的外交政策雜誌《國家利益》上撰文説，中國、台灣和美國的三邊關係現狀面臨嚴峻挑戰。美國“不插手”政策在過去三十多年曾經很有效，儘管出現過一些小的危機，但是，由於三邊關係出現新的趨勢，繼續“不插手”是否有效令人嚴重懷疑。
史文在文章中列出了美、中、台關係中的新趨勢：第一，中國迅速增長的軍力讓華盛頓不可能拒絕向台灣出售某些尖端武器，而中國卻不能接受。

第二，中國很快會覺得制裁美國向台灣出售武器的好處要超過可能付出的代價，而這將迫使中國未來的領導人採取危險行動來威懾或是懲罰未來的武器銷售。

第三，台灣和中國之間的深度不信任以及各自內部反對單邊讓步的強大政治力量使得中台之間的緊張關係取得重大緩解在很長時間內都不太可能。

綜上所述，史文認為“中國快速增長的軍力，中國日漸增強的經濟和政治制衡力以及國內高漲的民族主義都意味著在北京和台北出現穩定的妥協之前，很可能因為武器出售會爆發嚴重的危機”。

史文認為，鑑於美國是唯一一個可以促使中國削減在台海的軍事部署，並真正推動台海軍事和政治關係邁向更穩定發展的力量，他建議美國直接與北京談判，並與台灣磋商，就中國的軍力部署和美國對台軍售和國防援助制定一系列互相保證措施，並將其與最終就台灣地位展開政治對話聯繫起來。

美國“不插手”台灣事務政策的支援者認為，美中關係太重要，中國不會冒險採取重大措施制裁美國對台軍售，只要美國保證不向台灣出售某種尖端武器，並不支援台灣的獨立。

 

 

China, Taiwan, U.S.: Status Quo Challenged◎Michael Swaine / National Interest（2011.10.11）

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/us-provoking-china-over-taiwan-5996

The recent U.S. decision to upgrade Taiwan's existing fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft—taken in response to China's growing military threat to the island—has triggered a repeat of what most observers regard as a troublesome but ultimately manageable dynamic: Washington sells arms, Beijing blusters and threatens, the bilateral relationship suffers some disruption, and then everything returns to business as usual across the Taiwan Strait.  But this kind of business as usual could lead to a major crisis with China.

In the existing dynamic, Washington sees itself as a stabilizer, encouraging cross-strait dialogue, cautioning both sides that it will oppose any unilateral actions that might threaten the peace and deterring Beijing by maintaining its military predominance in the Western Pacific while boosting Taipei's defense capabilities.  All of this is basically done at arm's length.  Washington leaves it to Beijing and Taipei to resolve their political differences through direct contact while itself avoiding any dialogue with Beijing over the cross-strait military buildup, other than to indicate a willingness to reduce U.S. military assistance to Taiwan if Taipei sees a reduced requirement as a result of a unilateral Chinese drawdown.

This "hands-off" U.S. approach has worked reasonably well for more than thirty years, despite the occasional mini-crisis, thus creating the widespread expectation that it will continue to work indefinitely into the future.  The U.S.-China relationship, the argument goes, is too important for Beijing to risk serious damage to it by retaliating in any major way against U.S. arms sales, especially if Washington avoids providing Taiwan with certain advanced weapons (this time, it did not act on Taiwan's request to purchase new and more sophisticated F-16s—an apparent red line for Beijing) and does not endorse Taiwanese independence.

Moreover, proponents of the status quo assume that as long as Taiwan's political leadership welcomes greater cross-strait contact and does not seek permanent separation from the mainland, Beijing will always favor negotiation over coercion.  Indeed, currently improving cross-strait contacts supposedly suggest movement toward some sort of stable long-term modus vivendi.  Finally, according to this optimistic view, Washington will retain the military wherewithal to deter any Chinese resort to force, as long as Taipei is able to keep Beijing at bay long enough to let U.S. forces intervene in a conflict.

The problem with this argument is that several emerging trends cast significant doubt on its continued validity.

First, China's steady military buildup is rapidly making it impossible for Washington to resist selling far more sophisticated weapons to Taiwan of the sort that Beijing would view as unacceptable.  These would likely include more advanced aircraft, warships, and possibly missiles with both defensive and offensive capabilities.  Absent a major breakthrough in cross-strait relations or a highly unlikely unilateral Chinese drawdown of its direct military threat to Taiwan, such U.S. sales are virtually inevitable under current conditions.

Second, China's ability to inflict significant pain on the United States in retaliation for such arms sales to Taiwan is increasing.  If China's rapid growth continues and America's severe economic problems persist over many years, it is quite possible that Beijing will reach the point where its calculation of the benefits resulting from a variety of possible severe retaliations will outweigh their presumed costs.  This is especially true given the highly emotional nature of the Taiwan issue in China and its association with an increasingly assertive strand of nationalism.  Such forces could compel future Chinese leaders to undertake highly dangerous actions to deter or punish future arms sales.

Third, a tension-reducing breakthrough in cross-strait relations seems highly unlikely for a very long time, if ever. Despite all the improvements of recent years in those relations, Taipei and Beijing have yet to reach any understanding that would permit a reduction in their military buildups, much less a stabilizing dialogue over the island's political status.  The fault for this lies on both sides and is rooted in deep-seated mutual distrust as well as strong domestic political opposition to any unilateral conciliatory initiatives.  Moreover, this impasse will become even more likely if the pro-independence political opposition wins the Taiwan presidency next year—a definite possibility.

For many U.S. observers, the only "solution" to the intensifying problem created by these factors is to keep selling arms to Taiwan, plow ever-more scarce U.S. resources into maintaining military predominance in the Western Pacific, keep providing verbal assurances to Beijing that it does not support unilateral moves by Taiwan toward independence, and continue urging Taipei and Beijing to work out their differences peacefully.  But China's military buildup, its increasing economic and political leverage, and its growing nationalism suggest that a serious future crisis over arms sales will likely occur before any significant movement toward a stable modus vivendi between Beijing and Taipei emerges.

Only the United States can alter China's calculus toward Taiwan in ways that would facilitate a military drawdown and genuine movement toward a more stable cross-strait military and political relationship.  It is time for Washington to consider negotiating directly with Beijing, in consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding Chinese force levels and deployments, on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense assistance to Taiwan, on the other hand—linked to the eventual opening of a cross-strait political dialogue on the status of Taiwan.  Success in such an effort would be difficult but not impossible.  It would require political courage, diplomatic acumen, and a recognition that the current U.S. approach to Taiwan is probably unsustainable and could prove disastrous.

Michael D. Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the new book, America's Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century.