危機組織：中國內部缺乏協調致南海危機加劇◎VOA（2012.04.23）

【Comment】
政府目標不明確時遇上內部組織與事權不一，是非常危險的事情。這點，西方國家非常有經驗。反之，在東方國家中卻是不得侵犯的龍顏，與各有盤算的權錢禁地，沒人敢進言也無人敢管瓦上霜。更糟糕的是，北京會發覺並認為可在混水中摸魚。如此一來，就失去解決多頭馬車困境的政治意願了。
事實可能是外國並非和一個國家打交道，而是和一群「不一定能順暢運作的國家機器」對話。當各國家機器相互競爭時，相互間與和外國間難免擦撞出火花。

 

【相關閱讀】
一如2010：南海風雲驟，沒人敢示弱
危機組織：中國內部缺乏協調致南海危機加劇◎VOA（2012.04.23）

 

 

危機組織：中國內部缺乏協調致南海危機加劇◎VOA（2012.04.23）
http://www.voafanti.com/gate/big5/www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20120423-Crisis-Group-attributes-Chinas-lack-of-internal-coordination-for-tension-in-the-South-China-Sea-148565635.html

一個致力於阻止和解決流血衝突的國際組織説，中國沒有一個明確的法律框架，來支援其模糊不清的領土主權要求，這種情況下向南海派遣更多的巡邏和準軍事船隻，可能會導致更多對峙的風險。
總部設在比利時首都布魯塞爾的“國際危機組織”星期一發表了一份題為“攪動南中國海”(Stirring up the South China Sea)的報告，指出中國政府內部缺乏協調和授權不一致，助長了南海的緊張局勢。
國際危機組織的報告説，中國2009年向聯合國提交的地圖宣稱對幾乎整個南海海域擁有主權，其範圍包括在9段線內。但是，中國至今拒絕界定其主權宣稱的確切範圍，引起混淆，導致潛在衝突的發生。報告指出，中國有近12個政府機構在處理主權糾紛，他們在預算和權力上相互掣肘，各行其是，缺乏合作，一些巡邏船不知道所宣稱主權的區域範圍，甚至連海南省中國海事局的官員都不知道要保衛哪些領海。
中國處理海上事務的部門包括中國海事、海監、海警、漁政、海關、公安、航道、環保、海軍等。這種多個部門各自為政的管理，在海上領土主權糾紛日趨複雜的今天，形成了群龍無首的“九龍鬧海”之勢。
報告説，更迫在眉睫的衝突風險在於，在沒有一個明確的法律框架下，越來越多的中國執法和準軍事船隻，在有爭議的領土上發揮越來越大的作用。這些船隻捲入了大多數最近發生的海上事件，包括菲律賓和中國於今年4月第二個星期開始在斯卡伯勒淺灘（中國稱黃岩島）海域發生的艦船對峙。
4月10日，菲律賓最大的海軍旗艦“德爾畢拉爾”號在斯卡伯勒淺灘試圖登上據稱是在該海域避風的中國漁船，拘捕中國漁民並沒收他們的打撈收穫，但被兩艘後來趕到的中國海監船阻止，導致中菲之間發生罕見的船艦對峙。雖然中國漁船已全部離去，但中國和菲律賓都不肯率先撤離各自的船艦，並增派其他準軍事船隻，導致雙方在該海域的對峙仍在繼續。
有報道説，中國海巡部門目前計劃在2020年前將現有的人員從9千人增加到1萬5千人，船隻從280艘增加到520艘。

 

 

【相關閱讀】
Stirring up the South China Sea  Asia Report N°223 – 23 April 2012  International Crisis Group

Executive Summary

The conflicting mandates and lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies, many of which strive to increase their power and budget, have stoked tensions in the South China Sea.  Repeated proposals to establish a more centralised mechanism have foundered while the only agency with a coordinating mandate, the foreign ministry, does not have the authority or resources to manage other actors.  The Chinese navy’s use of maritime tensions to justify its modernisation, and nationalist sentiment around territorial claims, further compound the problem.  But more immediate conflict risks lie in the growing number of law enforcement and paramilitary vessels playing an increasing role in disputed territories without a clear legal framework.  They have been involved in most of the recent incidents, including the prolonged standoff between China and the Philippines in April 2012 in Scarborough Reef.  Any future solution to the South China Sea disputes will require a consistent policy from China executed uniformly throughout the different levels of government along with the authority to enforce it.

 

China’s maritime policy circles use the term “Nine dragons stirring up the sea” to describe the lack of coordination among the various government agencies involved in the South China Sea.  Most of them have traditionally been domestic policy actors with little experience in foreign affairs.  While some agencies act aggressively to compete with one another for greater portions of the budget pie, others (primarily local governments) attempt to expand their economic activities in disputed areas due to their single-minded focus on economic growth.  Yet despite the domestic nature of their motivations, the implications of their activities are increasingly international.  Other factors – both internal and external to China – have also been responsible for increasing tensions, but they are beyond the scope of this study.  Regional dynamics, including arms build-ups, competition for resources and increasing nationalist sentiment in other claimant countries are the subject of a separate report.

 

Effective coordination of actors is also hampered by a lack of clarity over precisely what is supposed to be defended.  China has yet to publicly clarify the legal status of the so-called nine-dashed line that appears on most Chinese maps, encompassing most of the South China Sea.  While the foreign ministry has taken steps to try to reassure its neighbours that Beijing does not claim the entire South China Sea and has at least partially justified its claims on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the government cannot easily back down from claims to significant portions of the sea that are based on historical presence in the region.  Local government agencies take advantage of this lack of legal clarity when engaging in activities in disputed areas. 

 

Beijing has deliberately imbued the South China Sea disputes with nationalist sentiment by perpetually highlighting China’s historical claims.  This policy has led to a growing domestic demand for assertive action.  While Beijing has been able to rein in nationalist sentiment over the South China Sea when it adopts a specific policy, this heated environment still limits its policy options and its ability to manage the issue.

 

In mid-2011, as tensions in the sea led to neighbouring countries seeking closer military ties with the U.S., China adopted a less assertive approach.  While Beijing’s overall emphasis on maintaining the status quo still includes a preference for bilateral negotiations, it is strengthening regional relations through high-level visits and multilateral engagement by signing with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea.

 

Internally, China has taken measures to calm nationalist sentiment and discourage aggressive actions by local agencies.  However, China’s current approach remains characterized by numerous ministerial-level actors and law enforcement agencies with no effective coordinating authority and no high-level long-term policy.  While repeated and failed attempts to establish a centralised mechanism on maritime management show a lack of political will to address the coordination issue, Beijing might also see benefit in ambiguity.  As long as this situation exists, however, its new conciliatory approach is unlikely to be sustainable.  Ultimately, the ability to manage relations in the South China Sea and resolve disputes will present a major test of China’s peaceful rise.

Beijing/Brussels, 23 April 2012