2004年Amazon致股東信：最重要的是自由現金流，而非收益｜見識之旅

導讀

這封信是2004年Amazon的第8封致股東信。

關於「自由現金流」，Jeff Bezos在1997年的第一封致股東信中就已提及。

他是這麼說的：「當被迫在優化GAAP會計報表和最大化未來現金流的現值之間做出選擇時，我們將選擇後者。」

自由現金流指的是「收益扣除維持收益需要投入的額外費用」之後剩下來的部分。這一部分才是投資後能真正拿到的回報。

若沒有考慮維持收益需要投入的額外費用，那收益只是虛幻的想像。

這也是為什麼自由現金流如此重要，讓你看透投資回報的本質。

值得一提的是，在「自由現金流」這件事上，Jeff Bezos跟巴菲特的理念是一致的。

在這封信中，Jeff Bezos舉例闡述他的理念，清楚展示了一個道理：當收益必須靠持續額外投入才能維持，那自由現金流有可能是負的，這不會是一筆好的投資。

好了，導讀結束，以下致股東信正文開始。

正文

To our shareholders:

致我們的股東：

Our ultimate financial measure, and the one we most want to drive over the long-term, is free cash flow per share.

我們的評估財務狀況的終極指標，也就是我們長期以來最想推動的指標，是每股的自由現金流。

Why not focus first and foremost, as many do, on earnings, earnings per share or earnings growth? The simple answer is that earnings don’t directly translate into cash flows, and shares are worth only the present value of their future cash flows, not the present value of their future earnings. Future earnings are a component — but not the only important component — of future cash flow per share. Working capital and capital expenditures are also important, as is future share dilution.

為什麼不像許多人一樣，首先關注收益，像是每股收益或收益增長？最簡單的答案是，收益並不會直接轉化為現金流。股價反映的是未來現金流的現值，而不是未來收益的現值。每股未來現金流部分來自未來收益，但不是全部。對未來現金流而言，未來收益不是唯一重要的，營運資本、資本支出和股權稀釋都有對未來現金流有重要影響。

Though some may find it counterintuitive, a company can actually impair shareholder value in certain circumstances by growing earnings. This happens when the capital investments required for growth exceed the present value of the cash flow derived from those investments.

儘管有些人可能會認為這樣做違反直覺。然而，某些情況下，公司確實可以透過提升收益，損害股東價值。當增長所需的資本投資超過這些投資所產生的現金流量現值時，這樣的事就會發生。

To illustrate with a hypothetical and very simplified example, imagine that an entrepreneur invents a machine that can quickly transport people from one location to another. The machine is expensive — $160 million with an annual capacity of 100,000 passenger trips and a four year useful life. Each trip sells for $1,000 and requires $450 in cost of goods for energy and materials and $50 in labor and other costs.

用一個簡化的例子來說明，假設一位企業家發明了一台機器，這台機器能夠快速將人們從A地送往B地。這台機器造價1.6億美元，一年能夠傳送10萬人次，使用壽命為4年。每次快速傳送的收費是1000美元，其中包括450美元的材料成本和50美元的人工成本。

Continue to imagine that business is booming, with 100,000 trips in Year 1, completely and perfectly utilizing the capacity of one machine. This leads to earnings of $10 million after deducting operating expenses including depreciation — a 10% net margin. The company’s primary focus is on earnings; so based on initial results the entrepreneur decides to invest more capital to fuel sales and earnings growth, adding additional machines in Years 2 through 4.

接著，業務繼續蓬勃發展，第一年機器就使用10萬人次，剛好用盡一台機器的價值。扣除折舊等運營費用後，將帶來1000萬美元的收入以及10％的淨利潤。這家公司最關注的正是收益。因此，根據結果企業家決定投入更多的資本以促進銷售和收益增長，並在第2年到第4年購買更多機器。

Here are the income statements for the first four years of business:

以下是營業前四年的損益表：

It’s impressive: 100% compound earnings growth and $150 million of cumulative earnings. Investors considering only the above income statement would be delighted.

這是令人印象深刻的表現：複合收益增長100％，累計收益達到1.5億美元。如果只考慮上述損益表的話，投資者將感到十分高興。

However, looking at cash flows tells a different story. Over the same four years, the transportation business generates cumulative negative free cash flow of $530 million.

然而，觀察現金流，你會有不同看法：在同樣一段時間中，運輸業務產生的自由現金流為「負5.3億美元」。

There are of course other business models where earnings more closely approximate cash flows. But as our transportation example illustrates, one cannot assess the creation or destruction of shareholder value with certainty by looking at the income statement alone.

當然，在其他商業模式中，收益可能更接近現金流。但是，正如我們的上述案例所顯示的，只看損益表是無法評估股東價值的增加或減少。

Notice, too, that a focus on EBITDA — Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization — would lead to the same faulty conclusion about the health of the business. Sequential annual EBITDA would have been $50, $100, $200 and $400 million — 100% growth for three straight years. But without taking into account the $1.28 billion in capital expenditures necessary to generate this ‘cash flow,’ we’re getting only part of the story — EBITDA isn’t cash flow.

同樣要注意的是，關注EBITDA（稅前息前折舊前攤銷前利潤）也可能會導致對業務狀況的誤判。連續四年，EBITDA分別為5千萬美元，1億美元，2億美元和4億美元，其中連續三年增長為100％。但是，這樣的表現來自於12.8億美元的資本支出，而我們只得到其中一部分回報－EBITDA無法跟現金流相提並論。

What if we modified the growth rates and, correspondingly, capital expenditures for machinery — would cash flows have deteriorated or improved?

當我們調整增長率和相應的資本支出之後，現金流會惡化還是改善？

Paradoxically, from a cash flow perspective, the slower this business grows the better off it is. Once the initial capital outlay has been made for the first machine, the ideal growth trajectory is to scale to 100% of capacity quickly, then stop growing. However, even with only one piece of machinery, the gross cumulative cash flow doesn’t surpass the initial machine cost until Year 4 and the net present value of this stream of cash flows (using 12% cost of capital) is still negative.

弔詭的是，從現金流角度來看，這項業務發展的越慢越好。為第一台機器投入初始資本之後，增長率迅速提升至100%，然後便停止增長。然而，就算是只有一台機器的情況，在第四年之前，現金流都比初始機器成本還低，現金流的淨值為負。

Unfortunately our transportation business is fundamentally flawed. There is no growth rate at which it makes sense to invest initial or subsequent capital to operate the business. In fact, our example is so simple and clear as to be obvious. Investors would run a net present value analysis on the economics and quickly determine it doesn’t pencil out. Though it’s more subtle and complex in the real world, this issue — the duality between earnings and cash flows — comes up all the time.

不幸的是，這樣的運輸業務存在根本上的缺陷。就算增長率再高，也無法讓資本投入的回報合理化。我們的例子是如此簡單明瞭且顯而易見。投資者只要進行淨現值分析，就會快速了解到這筆投資並不合算。雖然在真實世界中，評估收益是一件更加複雜的事，但收益和現金流之間的衝突依然時常發生。

Cash flow statements often don’t receive as much attention as they deserve. Discerning investors don’t stop with the income statement.

現金流量表常常沒有得到應有的重視。敏銳的投資者，觀察財務狀況不應限於損益表。

Our Most Important Financial Measure: Free Cash Flow Per Share

我們最重要的財務指標：每股自由現金流

Amazon.com’s financial focus is on long-term growth in free cash flow per share.

Amazon的財務重點是每股自由現金流的長期增長。

Amazon.com’s free cash flow is driven primarily by increasing operating profit dollars and efficiently managing both working capital and capital expenditures. We work to increase operating profit by focusing on improving all aspects of the customer experience to grow sales and by maintaining a lean cost structure.

Amazon的自由現金流，主要來自增加的營業利潤，以及營運資金和資本支出的效率提升。我們致力於改善客戶體驗的各個方面，提高銷售額，並維持精益的成本結構，最終實現營業利潤的提升。

We have a cash generative operating cycle because we turn our inventory quickly, collecting payments from our customers before payments are due to suppliers. Our high inventory turnover means we maintain relatively low levels of investment in inventory — $480 million at year end on a sales base of nearly $7 billion.

我們的營業週期足夠短，因為我們可以很快地把存貨售出，在向供應商付款前，先從消費者手中收到款項。我們的高庫存周轉率，意味著我們可以在庫存上投入比較低的金額。年底時，我們的銷售額近70億美元，但庫存僅投入4.8億美元。

The capital efficiency of our business model is illustrated by our modest investments in fixed assets, which were $246 million at year end or 4% of 2004 sales.

Amazon商業模式的運作效率，在固定資產的投資數據上表露無遺。固定資產在年底達到2.46億美元，僅佔2004年銷售額的4％。

Free cash flow grew 38% to $477 million in 2004, a $131 million improvement over the prior year. We are confident that if we continue to improve customer experience — including increasing selection and lowering prices — and execute efficiently, our value proposition, as well as our free cash flow, will further expand.

2004年，自由現金流量增長38％，達到4.77億美元，比上一年增長1.31億美元。我們有信心，如果我們持續改進客戶體驗（包括增加商品選擇與降低價格）並有效執行，我們的價值主張和自由現金流將進一步提升。

As to dilution, total shares outstanding plus stock-based awards are essentially unchanged at the end of 2004 compared with 2003, and are down 1% over the last three years. During that same period, we’ve also eliminated over six million shares of potential future dilution by repaying more than $600 million of convertible debt that was due in 2009 and 2010. Efficiently managing share count means more cash flow per share and more long-term value for owners.

至於股權稀釋，與2003年相比，2004年底流通在外的股票總額基本上沒有變化，在過去三年中下降了1％。同一時期，我們償還了2009年和2010年到期的可轉換債券，價值6億多美元，從而消除了600萬股可能會稀釋股權的股票。有效管理股票數量，意味著每股現金流量會更多，股東的長期價值會更高。

This focus on free cash flow isn’t new for Amazon.com. We made it clear in our 1997 letter to shareholders — our first as a public company — that when “forced to choose between optimizing GAAP accounting and maximizing the present value of future cash flows, we’ll take the cash flows.” I’m attaching a copy of our complete 1997 letter and encourage current and prospective shareowners to take a look at it.

對自由現金流的關注，對於Amazon來說並不稀奇。我們在1997年第一封致股東信中明確指出，當「被迫在優化GAAP會計報表和最大化未來現金流的現值之間做出選擇時，我們將選擇後者」。我會附上1997年的第一封致股東信，鼓勵現有和潛在的股東對此進行研究。

As always, we at Amazon.com are grateful to our customers for their business and trust, to each other for our hard work, and to our shareholders for their support and encouragement.

一如既往，Amazon感謝客戶的業務和信任，感謝彼此的辛勤工作，並感謝股東的支持和鼓勵。

Jeffrey P. Bezos

Founder and Chief Executive Officer

Amazon.com, Inc.

April 2005

傑夫·貝佐斯

Amazon創始人暨CEO

2005年4月

以上就是2004年Amazon致股東信。

想看隔年的Amazon致股東信，請至《2005年Amazon致股東信：那些不能靠數據決策的事，我們靠哲學》。

想看全系列導讀目錄，請至《Amazon 1997–2019年致股東信導讀目錄》。