2000年Amazon致股東信：股價雖大跌，體質依舊好｜見識之旅

導讀

這封信是2000年Amazon的第4封致股東信。

Jeff Bezos在寫這封信時，股價比去年同期跌了80%以上。在這封信中，Jeff Bezos提出數據證實Amazon「還在變得越來越好」。

他還引用巴菲特的老師，著名的投資者Benjamin Graham的名言：「短期來看，股市是一台投票機；長期來看，它是一台秤重機。」

Jeff Bezos以此宣告，Amazon會成為一間值得被放上秤重機的公司。

1999年發生了著名的達康泡沫，股價虛高的網路公司破滅，很多「被放上投票機的公司」股價暴跌，但Amazon不是其中之一。股價雖然大跌80%，但Amazon體質依然健康，未來依然值得被看好。

之所以這麼說，除了自身體質好、消費者仍有大量未被滿足的需求之外，Jeff Bezos也引用摩爾定律佐證Amazon未來能夠提供更好的服務－5年以後Amazon將可以在相同的價格上，以60倍的頻寬去服務用戶。

好了，導讀結束，以下致股東信正文開始。

正文

To our shareholders:

致我們的股東：

Ouch. It’s been a brutal year for many in the capital markets and certainly for Amazon.com shareholders. As of this writing, our shares are down more than 80% from when I wrote you last year. Nevertheless, by almost any measure, Amazon.com the company is in a stronger position now than at any time in its past.

哎！對於資本市場的許多人來說，這是殘酷的一年，對Amazon的股東來說更是如此。在撰寫這封信時，我們的股價比去年同期下降了80％，甚至更多。然而，無論從哪種角度來看，Amazon現在的地位比過去任何時候都還要穩固。

• We served 20 million customers in 2000, up from 14 million in 1999.
• 2000年，我們服務了2000萬消費者；1999年，這個數字只有1400萬。
• Sales grew to $2.76 billion in 2000 from $1.64 billion in 1999.
• 2000年，銷售額增長至27.6億；1999年，這個數字只有16.4億。
• Pro forma operating loss shrank to 6% of sales in Q4 2000, from 26% of sales in Q4 1999.
• 2000年，預估營業虧損在第四季度下降至6%；1999年，這個數字是26%。
• Pro forma operating loss in the U.S. shrank to 2% of sales in Q4 2000, from 24% of sales in Q4 1999.
• 2000年，美國市場的預估營業虧損在第四季度下降至2%；1999年，這個數字是24%。
• Average spend per customer in 2000 was $134, up 19%.
• 2000年，每個用戶平均消費金額提升19%，來到134元。
• Gross profit grew to $656 million in 2000, from $291 million in 1999, up 125%.
• 2000年，毛利潤增長至6.56億元；1999年，這個數字是2.91億元。
• Almost 36% of Q4 2000 U.S. customers purchased from one of our ‘’non-BMV’’ stores such as electronics, tools, and kitchen.
• 2000年第四季度，美國消費者中有36％從我們的「非BMV」商店購買像是電子產品、工具和廚房用品等商品。
• International sales grew to $381 million in 2000, from $168 million in 1999.
• 2000年，國際銷售額增長至3.81億元；1999年，這個數字是1.68億元。
• We helped our partner Toysrus.com sell more than $125 million of toys and video games in Q4 2000.
• 2000年，我們幫助銷售夥伴玩具反斗城（Toysrus）銷售超過1.25億的玩具和電動遊戲。
• We ended 2000 with cash and marketable securities of $1.1 billion, up from $706 million at the end of 1999, thanks to our early 2000 euroconvert financing. And, most importantly, our heads-down focus on the customer was reflected in a score of 84 on the American Customer Satisfaction Index.
• 2000年末，得益於年初的euroconvert融資，我們的現金和有價證券從1.06億增加至11億美元。 更重要的是，我們對客戶的重視與投入，反映在“美國客戶滿意度指數（American Customer Satisfaction Index）”中，我們獲得了84分。
• We are told this is the highest score ever recorded for a service company in any industry.
• 我們被告知，這是在各行業中有史以來所獲得的最高分。

So, if the company is better positioned today than it was a year ago, why is the stock price so much lower than it was a year ago? As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, ‘’In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.’’ Clearly there was a lot of voting going on in the boom year of’99 — and much less weighing. We’re a company that wants to be weighed, and over time, we will be — over the long term, all companies are. In the meantime, we have our heads down working to build a heavier and heavier company.

為什麼公司今天遠比一年前更好，股價會比去年同期低那麼多？正如著名的投資者本傑明·格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）所說：「短期來看，股市是一台投票機；長期來看，它是一台秤重機。」很顯然，1999年繁榮發展時，短期投票者眾，而長期權衡者少。我們是一間希望被長期秤量價值的公司，隨著時間流逝，我們會證明這點。同時，我們會埋首打造一間越來越重，值得被放上秤重機的公司。

Many of you have heard me talk about the ‘’bold bets’’ that we as a company have made and will continue to make — these bold bets have included everything from our investment in digital and wireless technologies, to our decision to invest in smaller e-commerce companies, including living.com and Pets.com, both of which shut down operations in 2000. We were significant shareholders in both and lost a significant amount of money on both.

你們之中的很多人，應該聽過我談論過「大膽賭注」。這些大膽賭注涵蓋從我們在數位科技和無線技術的投資，到我們決定投資規模較小的電商。這些電商包括live.com和Pets.com，這兩家電子商務公司都在2000年關閉了業務。我們在這兩家公司都是重要股東，並且在這兩家公司上損失了很多錢。

We made these investments because we knew we wouldn’t ourselves be entering these particular categories any time soon, and we believed passionately in the ‘’land rush’’ metaphor for the Internet. Indeed, that metaphor was an extraordinarily useful decision aid for several years starting in 1994, but we now believe its usefulness largely faded away over the last couple of years. In retrospect, we significantly underestimated how much time would be available to enter these categories and underestimated how difficult it would be for single-category e-commerce companies to achieve the scale necessary to succeed.

我們會進行這樣的投資，是因為我們深知在短時間內，我們不會進入這些領域。然而，在網路新領域進行「拓荒」，是我們堅信很重要的事。堅信拓荒的價值觀，對我們的決策一直都很有幫助。然而，我們現在認為，這樣價值觀的重要性日漸消失。回顧過去，我們大大低估了進入這些市場所需的時間，並低估了單一類別的電商公司，要成功擴大規模有多困難。

Online selling (relative to traditional retailing) is a scale business characterized by high fixed costs and relatively low variable costs. This makes it difficult to be a medium-sized e-commerce company. With a long enough financing runway, Pets.com and living.com may have been able to acquire enough customers to achieve the needed scale. But when the capital markets closed the door on financing Internet companies, these companies simply had no choice but to close their doors. As painful as that was, the alternative — investing more of our own capital in these companies to keep them afloat — would have been an even bigger mistake.

線上電商（相對於傳統零售）是一個規模化的業務，其特點是固定成本高而變動成本低。這樣的業務特性，使得中型規模的電子商務公司難以維持。有了較長遠的融資後，Pets.com和living.com已經盡可能地吸引足夠的客戶來達到所需的規模。 然而，當資本市場關閉了向互聯網公司融資的大門時，這些公司別無選擇，只能關門大吉。 和關門一樣痛苦的是，另一種選擇（將更多的自有資金投資於這些公司以維持其生存）將是一個更大的錯誤。

Future: Real Estate Doesn’t Obey Moore’s Law.

未來：真正有價值的資產並不遵守摩爾定律。

Let’s move to the future. Why should you be optimistic about the future of e-commerce and the future of Amazon.com?

讓我們看向未來。你為什麼應該對電子商務和Amazon的未來感到樂觀？

Industry growth and new customer adoption will be driven over the coming years by relentless improvements in the customer experience of online shopping. These improvements in customer experience will be driven by innovations made possible by dramatic increases in available bandwidth, disk space, and processing power, all of which are getting cheap fast.

不斷改善在線購物的用戶體驗，將在未來幾年推動行業發展，促使更多新用戶使用電子商務。網路頻寬的增加、硬碟空間增加和處理能力的顯著提升，推動著用戶體驗的改善，一切都會變得越來越便宜。

Price performance of processing power is doubling about every 18 months (Moore’s Law), price performance of disk space is doubling about every 12 months, and price performance of bandwidth is doubling about every 9 months. Given that last doubling rate, Amazon.com will be able to use 60 times as much bandwidth per customer 5 years from now while holding our bandwidth cost per customer constant. Similarly, price performance improvements in disk space and processing power will allow us to, for example, do ever more and better real-time personalization of our Web site.

按照摩爾定律，相同價格可購買到的處理能力，每18個月將提高一倍。相同價格可以買到到的硬碟空間，每12個月將提升一倍。相同價格可以買到的頻寬，每9個月提升一倍。也就是說，考慮到加倍的速度，5年以後Amazon將可以在相同的價格上，以60倍的頻寬去服務用戶。同樣地，硬碟空間和處理能力提升，將使我們的網站能夠做到更好的個性化服務。

In the physical world, retailers will continue to use technology to reduce costs, but not to transform the customer experience. We too will use technology to reduce costs, but the bigger effect will be using technology to drive adoption and revenue. We still believe that some 15% of retail commerce may ultimately move online.

在真實世界中，零售商將會持續運用技術，在不改變消費者體驗的情況下降低成本。我們也會運用技術降低成本，並透過技術促使更多用戶使用電商和提升收入。 我們仍然認為，大約15％的零售交易，最終可能會轉移到線上。

While there are no foregone conclusions, and we still have much to prove, Amazon.com today is a unique asset. We have the brand, the customer relationships, the technology, the fulfillment infrastructure, the financial strength, the people, and the determination to extend our leadership in this infant industry and to build an important and lasting company. And we will do so by keeping the customer first.

目前尚無定論，但我們依然努力證明：Amazon是個獨特的資產。我們擁有品牌、客戶關係、科技、技術基礎、財務實力、人才，決心在這個新產業擴展我們的領先地位，建立一個重要而且基業長青的公司。為了實現這個目標，我們將會持續把客戶擺在第一位

The year 2001 will be an important one in our development. Like 2000, this year will be a year of focus and execution. As a first step, we’ve set the goal of achieving a pro forma operating profit in the fourth quarter. While we have a tremendous amount of work to do and there can be no guarantees, we have a plan to get there, it’s our top priority, and every person in this company is committed to helping with that goal. I look forward to reporting to you our progress in the coming year.

2001年，在我們的發展中，將會是重要的一年。如同2000年一樣，這一年也會是重視專注與執行的一年。首先，我們設定了一個目標：在第四季度實現預估的營利目標。儘管我們還有大量的工作要做，也無法保證我們的計劃將會實現目標，但這依然會是我們最優先的目標，公司的每個人都要致力於實現這個目標。我期待明年可以向你匯報我們的進展。

As I usually do, I’ve appended our 1997 letter, our first letter to shareholders. It gets more interesting every year that goes by, in part because so little has changed. I especially draw your attention to the section entitled ‘’It’s All About the Long Term.’’

如同往年一樣，我會附上1997年的致股東信，也就是我們的第一封致股東信。隨著時間流逝，我們當年的價值觀變化依然非常小。我尤其推薦你關注「這一切關乎長期」的部分。

We at Amazon.com remain grateful to our customers for their business and trust, to each other for our hard work, and to our shareholders for their support and encouragement. Many, many thanks.

對於客戶的信任，以及股東的支持和鼓勵，Amazon非常感謝。非常，非常感謝。

Jeffrey P. Bezos

Founder and Chief Executive Officer

Amazon.com, Inc.

傑夫·貝佐斯

Amazon創始人暨CEO

以上就是2000年Amazon致股東信。

想看隔年的Amazon致股東信，請至《2001年Amazon致股東信：是時候了！讓我們開始降價吧！》。

想看全系列導讀目錄，請至《Amazon 1997–2019年致股東信導讀目錄》。